

Previous File

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POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.

1235

1913 .

Subject :

The situation in Mongolia

This File contains the following papers :—

YEAR.

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Memoranda.

If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

Register No.

Put away with

1235

13

Minute Paper.

5074

Secret Department.

● Two letters from So.

Dated 11/16 } Dec. 1913.
Rec. 12/16 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
			105 <i>Wm</i> 102
Under Secretary.....	18 Dec.	<i>At</i>	<u>Mongolia</u> The Russian Agreement: statement in the Reichstag as to attitude of German Govt. "Further reports by Lieut. Brinck on the commercial & industrial situation in Mongolia."
Secretary of State.....	18	<i>J.W.H.</i>	
Committee.....	19	<i>C.</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

12 Dec 13 + 16 Jan 14
+ 23

FOR INFORMATION.

The German Foreign Minister's statement regarding the Russian position in Mongolia is of special interest because it might be applied, mutatis mutandis, to our own "peculiar position" in regard to Tibet, where, it might be held, we claim privileges "opposed to the fundamental principle of equality of rights." But it would probably be possible to argue — were Germany to take up this attitude — that the German "most favored nation" clause does not apply to Tibet, just as ~~it~~ ^{it has been} maintained in

Seen Pol. Com'ee.,
22 DEC 1913

Previous Papers:—

4977

etc

~~maintained~~ in the past that our own m.f.n. rights
do not apply to Chinese Tientsin. In any case,
Germany has acquiesced for some 9 years in the
maintenance of British commercial agents in
Tientsin without claiming similar privileges for herself,
& has never challenged our right to make special
arrangements with China in regard to that
"particular portion of the Chinese Empire."



Treaty between Germany & China, 1861

Article 40. Il est convenu entre les Parties Contractantes, qu'il sera accordé aux Etats Allemands et à leurs sujets participation pleine et égale à tous les privilèges, immunités et avantages qui ont été accordés ou seront concédés dorénavant par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Chine au Gouvernement ou aux sujets d'une autre nation quelconque. En particulier tous les changements apportés en faveur d'une autre nation quelconque au tarif ou aux dispositions concernant les droits de Douane, de tonnage et de port, d'importation, d'exportation et de transit, seront immédiatement applicables au commerce des Etats Allemands contractants, ainsi qu'à leurs marchands, armateurs et capitaines par le seul fait de leur mise à exécution et sans qu'il faille un nouveau Traité.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No.

56357

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.



P

5074

Ref. 1.
This suggests that in my
last summary & action note (1)
in 1913. A.H. 18/12

4977
D.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India

_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

December 16, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Ambassador at Berlin No. 452 December 11, 1913.	Russo-Chinese Agreement resp. Mongolia. <div data-bbox="662 1583 1045 1717"><p>Copy to India 16 JAN 1914 (in type) + 23 Jan (in print)</p></div>

(Similar letter sent to

)

5074/13

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THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[December 15.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[56357]

No. 1.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 452.)

Berlin, December 11, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the following question was asked in the Reichstag on the 9th instant by Herr Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberal party :—

“Can the Imperial Chancellor furnish information as to whether the most-favoured-nation treatment accorded to the German Empire in virtue of the treaty with China of 1861 is properly guaranteed in the agreement between Russia and China of the 5th November, 1913, through which, on the one hand, the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia, and, on the other, the autonomy of the latter, is recognised?”


A reply was returned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as follows :—

“The provisions of the declaration which was signed on the 5th November of this year by Russia and China in regard to Mongolia are known to us through the reports of our representatives in St. Petersburg and Peking. According to this declaration, China recognises the autonomy of Mongolia, and its right to settle questions arising on the subject of commerce and industry. On the other hand, Russia recognises the suzerainty of China over Mongolia. An official notification of the agreement has not reached us as yet, neither from the Government in St. Petersburg nor in Peking. Since Germany, by article 40 of the German-Chinese commercial treaty of the 2nd September, 1861, was accorded unlimited most-favoured-nation rights, she has also a claim to all privileges, liberties, and advantages, which have been or will be granted by China to the Government or to the subjects of any foreign State. According, therefore, to established principles, our commercial treaty with China, and consequently also the most-favoured-nation treatment provisions, would apply equally to Mongolia, even if the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia were not expressly recognised. The Imperial Government has recently, moreover, already had occasion to announce to the Russian Government that, as an adherent to and active supporter of the principle of equality of rights both in regard to commerce and to the position of the subjects of all nations in China, it was not indeed in a position to concede to another Power any special privileges of a general nature in particular portions of the Chinese Empire, but that, in consideration of the peculiar position of Russia as having a common frontier with China, it was prepared to recognise such rights on the part of Russia as are based on particular treaties and agreements between Russia and the Central Government of China, in so far as such treaties and agreements have been officially communicated to us, and in so far as the rights arising therefrom are not opposed to the fundamental principle of equality of rights.”

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.


[1977 p—1]



THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[53661]



[November 27.]

SECTION 1.

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 423.)

Sir,

(4977)

Peking, November 12, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 406 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith further extracts from Lieutenant Binsteed's report on his recent journey through Mongolia. These extracts deal with agriculture, mining, fisheries, hunting, geography, and means of communication.

I have, &c.

B. ALSTON.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Extracts from Report by Lieutenant Binsteed regarding his Journey through Mongolia.

(F.)—AGRICULTURE AND OTHER INDUSTRIES.

I. Agriculture.

(a.) *The Urga-Kiakhta Area.*—Agriculture being an art utterly foreign to the Bargut and the Khalkha, it is carried out exclusively by Chinese and Russians. There is only one considerable agricultural area along the route traversed, namely, the country between Urga and Kiakhta, where Chinese colonisation and agriculture has been in existence since the early eighties. A great part of the flat valley bottoms in the basins of the Orkhon, Tola, Hara Gol, and Iro are cultivated. The crops are those known in Chinese terminology as Mai tzu (wheat), Ta mai, Yu mai (oats, a kind of), and Wan tou (beans). The streams in the valleys, with the aid of irrigation ditches, afford ample moisture, and the chief disadvantage lies in the depredations of early frosts, which almost yearly destroy much wheat.

The farms belong partly to Chinese trading firms in Urga, partly to plain Chinese farmers, almost exclusively from Shansi. Russian farms are very rare. The Chinese are now being subjected to great disabilities, as the result of which a large number of farmers have returned to China, but the vast majority remain on, because they have slowly surrounded themselves with considerable wealth represented in buildings, furniture, and flour mills, all of which, unlike their livestock, they would be quite unable either to realise in money or to remove to China. Again, unions with Mongol women tie many to their farms. Thus, though the farmers say they can make no profit now, their best course is still to remain on and live upon their property.

The disabilities to which the new Mongol Government has subjected Chinese landowners are :—

Instead of paying 1 ch'ien of silver per mou to the Hoshun authorities, they now pay 1 ch'ien 6 fen, and from next year for at least three years 2 ch'ien 5 fen per mou to the Central Urga Government. If the new rates were paid only on good arable land, they would still not be regarded as high, but the Chinese farmer is now paying dearly for the slipshod method of the old Ta Ch'ing officials. When the latter originally apportioned the farms, they did so in the most cavalier manner, marking off a great rough-hewn area irrespective of the fact that much of it might be useless for all development, and in compensation for such disadvantages they exacted only a very low rental on the whole area. Now the new Government has more than doubled the rental, and refuses to readjust the area rented, partly because it has no organisation capable of carrying out such a readjustment and partly because it has no desire to encourage Chinese agriculture. Thus the farmer now pays a high rental both on tillable ground and on rock, marsh, road, and river. The Mongol Government's one

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B

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answer to all complaints is: Pay full rent for all ground signed for in your original agreement under the Ta Ch'ings or clear out.

Few new Russian farms have been started lately, in spite of the fact that the Russians might now take over some of the ready-made farms vacated by Chinese. The abolition of the 50 verst free trade zone, as explained under "Commerce," does not encourage Russian colonisation. Even the former Russian farmers are greatly perturbed at the innovations introduced lately by the Central Mongol Government, which they fear may even be extended to the conditions under which they hold their farms from the Hoshun authorities.

The Chinese farmers grind their wheat into flour on the farms and sell in Urga and Kiakhta-Maimaicheng. Besides their permanent farm hands, they employ in the busy season numbers of Shansi coolies, who pick up a living at different seasons either in the two towns or in the country.

During late years a considerable haymaking industry has been developed in the area between and around Urga and Kiakhta. Even the Mongols also here make hay; some living near the Russian frontier even having acquired American (Deering, of Chicago) haymaking machines. The Russians also take a larger share in this industry and trade than in that of agriculture proper. Hay in Urga sells at 50 kopecks per 36 lb. It actually costs about 10 kopecks per 36 lb. to prepare, labour being very expensive. Russian methods for calculating wages for hay cutting are in general use even amongst Chinese.

(b.) In the immediate surroundings of Hailar there are Chinese kitchen gardens. No other Chinese agriculture in Barga is permitted by the new Bargut authorities.

(c.) Chinese traders in Khalkha generally have a kitchen garden for their own use behind their premises. On the Kerulen they state that, given irrigation, almost all northern crops and vegetables thrive. Except for the above, there is no agriculture or haymaking anywhere on the route I followed.

II. Mining.

The only mining operations met with were those of the Mongolyor Company in the Iro basin. As is well known this company was formed and registered in Russia by von Grote, and acquired from the Chinese Government the exclusive right to prospect for and exploit all gold in the two Aimake of Tushetu Khan and Tsetsen Khan. Lately I. V. Pokrovski has been appointed local director-in-chief of the company in place of von Grote, who left the company owing to his dislike of the new Mongol Government.

The company now works the following fields in the Iro basin: Iro, Toiogoika, Mogoi, Harganati, Narin-Harganati, Yalbiik, Ulentoi, and Nilkho, whilst outside the Iro basin work is already carried on in the valleys of the Kudara (a tributary of the Chikoi in Mongolia), Tereltzi (tributary of the upper Kerulen), and Hara Gol at Tzo Modo. Prospecting, which is chiefly carried out during the winter, is being further extended in the Kerulen and Onon basins and south-west of Urga. M. Pokrovski himself hopes next year to reconnoitre the Onon and Uldza areas. The administrative headquarters and head offices of the company have just been moved from Urga to the Iro goldfield. These are connected by telephone with the other fields in the Iro basin, but the projected plan for a telephone line to Urga has not yet been realised. A map of the area from Kiakhta to Urga has already been partly made, and is being completed. This survey will later be extended to the new areas, in which it is hoped that gold will be found. A postal service connects the Iro headquarters with Urga. All the gold obtained by the company is sent via Kiakhta and Russia to Belgian and French firms. The Russian Government is a most unsatisfactory purchaser, for the reason that they refuse to pay on delivery for the total amount of gold received. They only consent to pay for the nearest round number quantity in weight below what is actually delivered. As gold is very expensive when compared to its weight, it often happens that large sums of money are left owing to the vendor until the next consignment of gold arrives. The Belgian and French firms, on the other hand, pay at once the exact price, and even at a somewhat higher rate than the Russian Government, for the total amount delivered at each consignment.

The Mongolyor Company uses three methods for obtaining its gold. These are:—

1. Work by the company itself by means of labourers hired by the day.

2. The lease of whole areas to capitalised organisations who find all the necessary capital for exploitation, pay no rent, but are bound to sell all gold obtained to the Mongolyor Company at rates from 24 to 27 roubles per Chinese liang of weight.

3. Lease of small areas to minor combinations of labourers, who are provided by the company with the necessary equipment, and are bound to sell all gold to the company for about 24 roubles per liang.

To its own day labourers the company pays a daily wage of 1 rouble to Russians and 80 roubles to Chinese. The company is now instituting more modern methods with machinery and horse traction for the earth carts. Inspectors are appointed to prevent any stealing of gold by day labourers or by the minor leasees of areas. Sealed dredgers are also used for the purpose. However, from an unbiased Western European source, I was informed that the comparatively small profits of the company are in part due to much leakage of gold. The inspectors are themselves not very highly paid by the company. All workers on the mines pay to the Mongol Government a tax of 1 rouble per head per month for the right to work on the fields, in exchange for which they receive a form of passport.

On the whole Chinese still predominate somewhat in the goldfields, though large numbers have departed recently partly owing to the disabilities imposed upon them by the Mongol Government, partly owing to new regulations by the company whereby, instead of receiving a modicum of food during the winter, they are now left to find a livelihood for themselves, and partly owing to the great recrudescence of brigandage in the neighbourhood. The latter circumstance accounts for the departure of very large numbers, not only of Chinese, but also of Russian workers from the goldfields. This summer brigandage became so bad that about 100 Russian soldiers from the Kiakhita were sent into the area, and were distributed from the Khangou range north-west of Kornakovka eastwards to the Iro goldfields. The increase of brigandage is itself chiefly due to the fact that now numbers of Chinese are left without means of livelihood during the winter. In M. Kornakof's opinion the state of affairs will be very serious this winter, and he regards it as a great mistake that the Russian military posts were withdrawn at the end of the summer.

The following figures give the yearly find of gold in the Mongolyor fields to the nearest pood :—

						Average Poods.
1901-1908..	11
1908-1909..	71
1910	120
1911	120

The yearly profits of the company were as follows :—

						Roubles.
1907-1908	14,603
1908-1909	171,807
1910	373,877
1911	338,431

III. Fisheries.

(a.) The most considerable fisheries met with were those of the Russians on the Arshun River. These fisheries, which existed last year for the first time on a very small scale, have this year been tremendously developed. The Arshun between Buir Nor and Dalai Nor has a total length of about 160 miles, while some 40 miles of the river's banks have been taken up in fishery concessions, the total number of which amount now to twenty-seven. Last year the two or three concessionnaires paid 100 roubles per verst for the season. This year the Bargut authorities exact 600 roubles per verst per year for a concession term of five years.

The river is amazingly rich in fish. This is not surprising, having regard to the fact that Mongols regard fishing as a sin, and until lately prevented others also from fishing. The chief kinds are the sazan (a delicacy), shchuka, som, and karass. The concessionnaires come originally from all parts of Russia, and include a large percentage of Jews. The labour is chiefly Russian, Korean, Chinese, and Japanese. At the busiest time some concessions employ over 200 hands. The fish are transferred alive into ponds dag near the river bank, where they are kept till the winter. They are then frozen and despatched via Manchuria Station to all parts of Russia and

Siberia. The demand always exceeds the supply. The following figures represent the catch at those concessions to which I happened to be near:—

In 4 versts ($2\frac{2}{3}$ miles) 110,000 fish during this summer up to the 18th August.
In 1 verst ($\frac{2}{3}$ mile) last season 5,000 poods (over 80 tons).

The Russian concessionnaires are frequently at enmity amongst themselves, and some try to take illegal advantages by blocking the passage of the fish with wire nets. In general the fishing is not properly controlled, and it is obvious that the concessionnaires only wish to make a fortune in as few years as possible, regardless of the future of the industry.

A Chinese labourer receives 20 to 25 roubles per month, and fish *ad libitum* for his own consumption. A Korean gets 30 roubles, and a Russian from 25 to 40 roubles, also with fish. A Chinese or Korean has to spend 4.50 roubles per month on food, other than fish, for his own maintenance.

Russians unanimously testified that it was impossible to obtain concessions without heavy bribes to the new Bargut officials.

(b.) On Kerulen at Altan Emel, 15 miles from its mouth, there is a Russian fishery.

(c.) On the Tola and Iro Rivers, Russians fish free of all dues, and without any lease of special reach. There are, however, no regular fishery establishments, the industry being in the hands of peasants, who visit the river for short periods.

(d.) I met a Russian merchant who had just obtained from the Urga Government a fishing concession on Lake Tor and the Shishkit River in the Darkhati country in Eastern Urianghai. He said his was the first fishing concession in that part of Mongolia.

IV. Hunting.

I met numerous parties of Russian peasants from Transbaikalia proceeding on hunting expeditions into Mongolia. These peasants, in parties of five to ten, leave their homes after the harvest and hunt squirrel, bear, sable, and marmot for three or four months in the mountainous wooded area of the Kentei. The furs they sell on return at local fairs in Transbaikalia. The industry is said to be very profitable.

(H.)—MISCELLANEOUS.

Other information not concerning actualities, but on such subjects as the administrative and tribal system, Lamaism and its temples, and Mongol life and customs is available if required.

G. C. BINSTEED,

The Essex Regiment.

Peking, November 3, 1913.

(G.)—GEOGRAPHICAL.

I. Maps.

(a.) The Russian General Staff, 40 verst to 1-inch map, and its reduction the 100 verst to 1-inch.

Everywhere I saw and heard testimony to the effect that this map of Mongolia is utterly worthless. Russian officers and engineers recounted instances of its amazing incorrectness. Not only are points marked up to 100 versts distant from their real position, but the whole delineation of rivers and their tributaries and of mountains over large tracts is purely imaginary. I will here only point out some very important corrections which require to be made:—

1. The intersection of the Khalkha-Barga frontier with the Kerulen runs roughly near Chik-Chiraki, about 110 versts west of where it is shown on the Russian map.

2. Tsetsen Khan's Urgo (in Russian Stavka Tsetsen Khana) must be far further east than shown, perhaps by about 70 versts. Colonel Novitski in 1906 pointed this out, but the General Staff, although they issue new editions, in the corner of which they print, "added to and corrected in 1911," apparently do not take the trouble to correct the map outside Siberia.

3. The great southward bend marked between Tsetsen Khan's Urgo and Ekure-Khalkha is, I believe, absolutely non-existent. The river continues to flow north-east all the way from Tsetsen Khan's Urgo to the Ekure-Khalkha bend.

4. The whole courses of the Iro Gol and Hara Gol and their tributaries are absolutely wrongly shown. (See later under Molchanof's sketch.) The main watershed between the central Hara Gol and the upper Iro ought to be shown much further south.

Again, there are many local names printed on the map in the Kerulen country and in Barga which no Mongol has ever heard of, and at points where it is impossible to find any permanent inhabited locality deserving of being marked. On the other hand, the various temples which form the only permanent inhabited localities are ignored on the Russian map. To mark the names of places where yurts are pitched is useless, because at another season or in another year perhaps no Mongol will select this place as his residence.

I received the impression from conversation with Russian officers and engineers that, though the General Staff has numerous road and other sketches made from time to time by officers and travellers, it has no connected map of Mongolia better than the 40 verst. There is, however, a confidential 10 verst to 1-inch map of Barga prepared by the Harbin staff.

(b.) I. A. Molchanof has just published in the journal of the Kiakhta branch of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, Tome XIV, a sketch of part of the country between Urga and Kiakhta. This, though a mere outline of routes and rivers, is accurate, and is therefore a valuable improvement on the misleading General Staff map.

(c.) The Mongolyor Company are engaged in producing a map of the area in which they work mines, and through which run the roads constructed by them. This is based on theodolite triangulation, and cannot, therefore, help being an improvement. The sheets completed are in the form of blue prints. The map is for the use of the company, and therefore does not show detail far from the goldfields and the roads.

II. Communications.

1. Mongolia and Barga.

(a.) My route followed from Hailar to Urga.

The whole of the route followed from Hailar as far as Tsetsen Khan's Urgo was over an excellent naturally-formed track suitable for any traffic, including motors. At a few points near Gangjur, in Barga, belts of sand dunes up to 300 yards in width form a serious obstacle; otherwise conditions could not be better. From Tsetsen's Khan's Urgo westwards to Urga the track contains several high and steep passes, gradients reaching 1 in 10 over rocky ground. The road I followed is known as the Dondot Dzam or Middle Road, there being two other alternative roads between Urga and Tsetsen Khan Urgo. Halting places with water are plentiful.

(b.) Proposed new motor road.

The route Urga—southernmost bend of Kerulen—along Kerulen to Manchuria Station is attracting attention as being suitable for motor traffic, which, it is rumoured, is to be established by a "Lloyd" company. From Tsetsen Khan Urgo to the mouth of the Kerulen this coincides with my route. Lieutenant Mwilnikof (whom I met as stated in Section E) said he was travelling over this route as being "a new commercial highway." Colonel Nadyojni questioned me as to its advantages in respect of the movement of troops.

(c.) The Mongolyor Company's road.

From Urga to Kiakhta I travelled near all the way on the road made by von Grote for the Mongolyor Company. From Urga to the Hara Gol this is a first class unmetalled but made road with drains and culverts where necessary, an even surface, and no excessive gradients. From the wooden bridge by which it crosses the Hara Gol to the point where it joins into the Urga-Kiakhta post road near Ibit Tsik, the road is the usual Mongol track improved where necessary with culverts. It passes over several extremely difficult passes with gradients reaching to 12° on a rough road.

It would be almost impossible to move four-wheeled army transport over these passes. In winter these passes can be circumvented by way of the ice on the River Iro, which, however, makes such great bends that the distance by river is often from two to three times longer. In summer the river route is only available for boats and rafts, as the Iro at times passes through precipitous gorges where there is no road.

N.B.—If required I can supply complete details as to my whole route, as to water, gradients, soil, grass, direction, &c.

(d.) Motor traffic, Urga-Kiakhta.

A Russian resident in Urga runs a motor for passengers between Urga and Kiakhta, the journey taking a day. This method of travelling is not popular owing to the great inconvenience to passengers when the motor breaks down. There is no organisation of rest houses or repair depôts. The general opinion is that the motor will soon cease to run.

(e.) Navigation of Selenga in Mongolia.

A steamer (the "Rabotnik") has actually moved 70 versts up the Selenga, within Mongolia, and 100 versts up the Orkhon. It is believed that navigation is possible as far as the confluence of the Egin Gol, and on the Orkhon to that of the Tola. The main difficulty, as on the Selenga in Siberia, will be found in shifting sands.

(f.) Urga-Kiakhta Railway. (See below under Siberia, Kiakhta Railway.)

2. Siberia.

(a.) Kiakhta-Verkhne Udinsk motors.

The old post-horse communication between Verkhne Udinsk and Kiakhta is now replaced by motors and motor-busses. Breakdowns cause the change to be not over popular.

(b.) Kokovin and Basof, who own the two steamers, "Rabotnik" and "Seraphim," which now ply on the Selenga, intend next year to add two more steamers to the Selenga fleet. Shifting sands make navigation at low water seasons very difficult, and preclude the possibility of placing lanterns and other navigation marks on the banks. Navigation closes in middle of October. The journey from Ust Kiakhta to Verkhne Udinsk, timed to take 12 hours, at low water often extends into days owing to delays from running aground.

(c.) Railway to Kiakhta.

It is now definitely decided that this railway is to be commenced next spring. The question as to which of the alternative routes is to be used is still undecided, and will be settled at a special conference in November. As to the details of the Mwisovsk route I reported last year. The alternative Verkhne Udinsk route runs as follows: From Verkhne Udinsk up right bank of Selenga and Hilok to Podlopatki, here crosses Hilok and runs up left bank to the sharp bend in that river. Thence south-west and west to Beregovaya (10 versts below point where the Chikoi intersects with the Kiakhta-Bichurskoye road). At Beregovaya crosses Chikoi, and thence to Troitzkosavsk. Colonel Hitrovo favours the Mwisovsk route, and desires an extension to rejoin the main Transbaikalian Railway at Petrovski Zavod. M. Pokrovski believed the Verkhne Udinsk route would be adopted.

Extension to Urga.—Colonel Hitrovo, and, according to him, responsible Russian opinion in general is against any extension of the railway to Urga. It is desired to create a great commercial centre at Kiakhta which shall attract all trade from Urga, Zain Shabi, Uliasutai, and other centres in the Selenga basin, part of the trade of which even now converges on Kiakhta. If the railway were extended to Urga, the latter and not Kiakhta would become the important economic centre, which is not desired by the Russian Government. The idea of a through line to Kalgan is pronounced as fatal to Russian interests, since trade would inevitably trend to the south and not to Siberia. Moreover, Russia desires nothing which might destroy the buffer she wishes to maintain between Siberia and North China.

(d.) The doubling of the Transbaikal Railway.

The work of doubling the line is not even yet completed. The permanent way is finished, and rails laid wherever no difficulties had to be met with, but difficult cuttings and embankments are not finished, nor are many of the bridges. The following are some details noted :—

(a.) Bridge over River Uda finished, and rails laid. (b.) Bridge over River Chita finished, but rails not laid. (c.) Bridge over stream joining Ingoda just west of Atamanovski siding (east of Chita) finished, but rails not laid and approaches not finished. (d.) Same at bridge over Ingoda's tributary at verst 1,011 (just west of Kruchina). Between Kitaiski Razyezd and Manchuria Station there are no signs of doubling, except that, as I reported last year, one or two bridges have been doubled.

3. Manchuria.

(a.) The Chinese Eastern Railway from Manchuria Station to Harbin.

No signs of doubling, except that, in the marshy area between the Nonni and Harbin, work is still being continued for the purpose of doubling some bridges and certain lengths of the permanent way at places where water forms a danger. Some of these doubled stretches are several versts in length, but there is nothing to support the view that a general doubling of the line is being carried out. As regards banking engines on the Khingan inclines, going west the second engines are taken at Bukhedu and dropped at Khingan. Going east they are taken at Irekte, and for some heavier trains even earlier.

G. C. BINSTED,
The Essex Regiment.

Peking, November 2, 1913.

Register No.

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Dated } 5 Dec 1913.
Rec.

Letter from 20.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	9 Dec.	ad	<p><u>Mongolia</u></p> <p>The political + commercial situation: report by Lieut: Birsteed, of H.M.'s Legation, Peking.</p>
Secretary of State.....	9	J.W. H	
Committee.....	11	E	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India - 5 Dec '13

FOR INFORMATION.

Lieut. Birsteed's main conclusions
are summarised on p. 5.

The first two points have their bearing on our
own difficulties. It will be very easy, by a
policy of "economic starvation" for us to lose the
sympathy of the Tibetan Govt & people - with the
result of restoring the pro-Chinese party to power
& so defeating our own ends


Seen Pol. Comtee,
22 DEC 1913

Previous Papers:—

4920
4569 ek

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[November 15.]

SECTION 1.

[51903]

No. 1.

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 406.)

Sir,

Peking, November 1, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 365 of the 20th September, I have the honour to enclose herewith an extract from notes which have been compiled by Lieutenant Binsteed, a language officer attached to His Majesty's Legation, during a journey from Hailar to Urga and thence to the Siberian frontier at Kiatkha. Lieutenant Binsteed, in addition to having undertaken two previous journeys in Mongolia, is possessed of a fluent knowledge of the Russian language, and has thus been in a position to converse freely with the Russian authorities at Urga, and with the other Russian officials who are endeavouring to guide the fortunes of the semi-independent Mongolian State. (4569)

The extracts from Lieutenant Binsteed's report which are enclosed in this despatch deal chiefly with the commercial side of the Mongolian question. The conclusion to be drawn from them is that the Mongolian market has, owing to the state of anarchy which has prevailed during the past year, been denuded of goods of all classes; that Russian trade is at present incapable of supplying Mongolian requirements; that there thus exists a good opening for British commercial enterprise; and that the entry of British goods into Mongolia would be welcomed by the native population and not opposed by the Russians.


The above view is borne out by the opinions expressed to me some days ago by two directors of the British-American Tobacco Company, who called on me in company with a European agent who has represented them at Urga during the last two years. They informed me that they have lately received large orders from the Mongolian capital, and that they are about to despatch from Kalgan a caravan of 300 camels laden with candles, piece-goods, and cigarettes. They enquired whether I had yet received any definite information regarding the levy by the Mongolian authorities of duty on all goods other than those of Russian origin. This duty they understood to amount to 10 per cent. *ad valorem*, and they appeared somewhat doubtful of the information furnished to Mr. Binsteed in Urga to the effect that the duty amounted to 5 per cent. only. In the event of this information being correct, they were not prepared to say that the levy would prove wholly disastrous to their trade. It could not, however, fail to act as a very serious handicap, since foreign goods which had entered a Chinese port and had been despatched thence to Urga would be penalised to the extent of no less than 12½ per cent. as compared with Russian goods which entered Mongolia via the northern frontier. Even in the event of Russia being unable to supply the wants of the Mongolian market, the present state of affairs could not but react most unfavourably on consumption in a country chiefly remarkable for the poverty of its inhabitants.

The Directors of the British-American Tobacco Company finally informed me that they were convinced of the possibilities of Mongolia as a field of enterprise, that they were determined not to lose the footing which they had already gained and that, in spite of all difficulties, they would continue to despatch caravans to Urga, and would pay under protest whatever duty might be demanded. I concurred in this attitude, and have written to the Board of War requesting that facilities may be given for the passage of the first caravan through the large body of Chinese troops stationed between Kalgan and the frontier of Inner Mongolia. I would add as a significant fact that the directors of the British-American Tobacco Company appeared less apprehensive of the effects of the Mongolian tariff or of the possibilities of Mongol attacks on the caravan, than of the attitude of the Chinese troops, who are said to show more aptitude for looting than for fighting.

Mr. Binsteed, in addition to dealing with the commercial situation in Mongolia, has called attention in his report to the very lukewarm feelings of gratitude entertained by a portion of the Mongolian population towards their Russian protectors, and also to the existence of an influential party which favours a return to allegiance to the

[1946 p—1]

B



Copy to the Secy,
5 Dec. 1913.

— Chinese Government. The existence of this anti-Russian opposition is probably due in part to economic pressure resulting from the anarchical situation which has prevailed in the country during the past year, in part to an awakening consciousness that the Russians are likely to prove as severe taskmasters as their Chinese predecessors, and in part to the strenuous efforts of the Peking Government to regain by bribes, decorations, and similar methods the sympathies of the Mongolian Princes. Some measure of success has already attended Chinese efforts in this direction, for during the month of September an important Mongol leader and a former Vice-Minister of War to the Urga Government entered Kalgan under the ægis of the Chinese authorities, and has since been accorded a fitting reception in Peking. He has further announced his intention of bringing over to the Chinese a considerable body of armed followers, and it seems probable that this proof of the waning enthusiasm of the Mongols for their Russian protectors may have induced the latter to hasten the conclusion of an agreement with the Chinese Government which, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 240 of the 30th October, is now approaching signature.

Apart from the diplomatic success mentioned above, the Chinese Government also have little reason to desire the perpetuation of the friction between themselves and the Russian Government which has resulted from the uncertainty of the Mongolian situation. Reliable information as to the military situation on the frontier is practically unobtainable, but it is probably not too much to say that the operations undertaken by the Chinese forces have been almost invariably unsuccessful. One indecisive victory is said to have been gained during September under the walls of Dolonor, and to have resulted in a sudden stiffening of the attitude of the Peking Government, who demanded the inclusion in the Russian Agreement, then on the point of signature, of a declaration to the effect that Mongolia remained an integral part of China. Negotiations were immediately broken off by the Russian Legation, the victory was followed by what is said to have been a crushing defeat inflicted on the Dolonor garrison which had followed the enemy into the hills, and the Chinese Government are at last prepared to acquiesce in what has, for the last six months, been a *fait accompli*.

Outer Mongolia is, in fact, irretrievably lost to them. What will be the ultimate fate of inner appears to depend largely on the measure of control which Russia can exercise over the Mongol forces raised under her auspices. The Russian Government themselves do not, I think, wish to do more than erect an effective buffer—of which the Gobi desert will be the frontier—against the possibilities of future Chinese aggression, and I understand that they by no means favour Mongol pretensions over inner Mongolia and the outlying districts of Chihli province. Whether the Mongol forces will themselves acquiesce in such a policy of abstention appears extremely doubtful. They are opposed by some 40,000 Chinese troops who have been constantly defeated, and whose efficiency must tend to become less and less with the advance of the cold weather.

Under these circumstances it appears improbable that the Chinese forces will be able, during the coming winter, to do more than hold the frontier outposts which they occupy at present.

I have, &c.
B. ALSTON

Enclosure in No. 1.

Extract from a Report by Lieutenant Binsteed on a Journey from Hailar to Urga, and thence to Kiakhtha.

COMMERCE in Khalkha and Western Barga during my journey may be said to be rapidly becoming non-existent. The usual routes from the south by which Mongolia is wont to be supplied with the vast mass of her requirements have been completely closed by the predatory warfare of the Mongol bands. No goods have come through across the Gobi from China this year. If the now well-known fact be borne in mind that the Russian merchant cannot be persuaded to be content with moderate profits, and also that the Chinese traders, handicapped with the 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duty exacted from Chinese alone by the new Mongol Government, are

hardly able to compete with the Russians if they import goods by the expensive route via Manchuria Station, it is obvious that the blocking of the southern roads could not fail to lead to a great rise in prices. But this great rise in prices is of comparative unimportance when placed side by side with a further and most unusual consequence of the Mongol policy. Instead of seizing the magnificent opportunity, created for it by the Russian-guided Mongol policy, of making large profits by supplying all the wants of a population who would have no alternative but to accept the high prices demanded, the Russian trading community has done almost nothing to meet the situation. In the area I traversed, the actual number of Russian traders, and its increase since last year, are both infinitesimal. Between Hailar and Urga, a distance of 700 to 800 miles along the chief arteries of life and communication, I found only four Russian trading establishments. Last year there was one. Of the four only two could boast of a house, the total stock of the other two firms being contained in one, or at most two, yurts. The numerous Chinese traders have either decamped altogether and returned to China, or else are remaining on in the somewhat pitiable condition of waiting to see what is going to happen next. In all but one or two rare cases they have no goods left for sale. To illustrate the situation better, let us survey the details at the important centre of San Peitzo Urgo. Last year there were here one Russian and thirty Chinese trading houses. This year there are three Russian shops, of which one is only an off-shoot from the old firm of last year; of the thirty Chinese firms only six remain, of which four are without goods; one of the remaining two manages to buy goods somehow at Manchuria Station, brought round by the expensive railway route, and, though paying 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duty at Manchuria Station to the Bargut authorities, sells them at San Peitzu Urgo at a price which is able to compete with the Russians; lastly, the sixth Chinese firm is merely a partnership of coolies trying to raise enough money to buy railway tickets back to China.

Almost without exception every Mongol I met in the vicinity of his own home between Urga and Hailar asked me the question, "Have you brought anything to sell?" Already buda ("hsiao mi tzu," millet) and brick tea are getting scarce. Clothes are slowly being worn out. There is no means of replacing the deficit except by journeying perhaps hundreds of miles to Urga or some other great centre where a shop exists. Even there everything will be much dearer than it was formerly, and there is also to be considered the expense of the journey. Lastly the poorest classes have not the wherewithal, or perhaps the leisure, to make these long journeys to buy their requirements.

To quote some more details: Russian traders from Manchuria Station admitted to me that they made from 50 to 60 per cent. clear profit on most of the goods they sold. Again, it must be borne in mind that even the goods sold by the Russian traders are for the most part what are loosely termed "Chinese goods," that is to say, goods that come from China and of identically the same origin as those formerly sold by the Chinese. As a matter of fact, a great proportion of these "Chinese goods," especially the piece goods, are of English and other European or American origin. The new Russian traders retail a great many of these "Chinese goods," which are the only kinds which the conservative Mongol will use; but there remain a great many articles which the Mongol requires and which Russia does not produce, and which the Russian merchants do not stock. Of such articles the Mongol is now wholly deprived. It will only be with the greatest difficulty and delay that he will be persuaded to make use of Russian substitutes for such "Chinese goods" to which he has been accustomed.

Another example of the inertness of the Russian trading community is the fact that at the time of my visit Urga was and had been for some time absolutely bereft of all oil for lighting purposes and all spirit. In general it is extremely difficult to obtain many most ordinary requirements in Urga. Prices are very high (oats 1.80 to 2 roubles per 36 lb.; flour, third class quality, 4 roubles per 36 lb.) Earlier in the year prices were even higher. Many goods were unobtainable. Many Russian firms sent agents to report on conditions at Urga during the past year, and most of these agents have reported adversely with the result that very few new firms have appeared there. The Russian consul has tried to impress upon firms the necessity for sending proper business men to look after the branches in Urga, and not mere moujiks like the mass of the present Urga tradesmen.

I will next consider the reason why the Russian commercial world has failed to profit by the opening made for it by the Russian diplomatic world. As a preliminary it should be pointed out that the word failure would probably only be

termed "Nationalist," though the Russians often call it the pro-Chinese party. It includes Hui San. Its programme includes the peaceful settlement by compromise of differences with China, the attraction of western European trade and consuls, the maintenance of Lamaism and of the pacific tendencies of Mongol life.

The other party may be termed the military and outwardly pro-Russian party. It includes those who, from ideas of sound expediency or less worthy motives, support the Russian proposals, especially the foundation of a Mongol army. This party includes Dalai Wang, Hui Ta Ch'ing Wang, and Sain Noin. Tushetu Wang and Erdeni Wang (the former Namsarai Kung, a great personal friend of the Urga Hutukhtu) are regarded as caring for nothing except their own pockets. Everywhere I heard testimony as to the corruption of the new Mongol officials. Sain Noin's secret pro-Chinese sympathies were attributed by M. Miller to his vanity and personal ambition, which caused him to be attracted by the glitter of coveted titles and distinctions bestowed from Peking. The list of Ministers in Urga is as follows:—

Premier (a post created last autumn by Russian advice, specially to overrule the Ta Lama): Sain Noin.

Minister of Interior: The Ta Lama.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Hui Ta Ch'ing Wang (Hui Ta Dorji).

Minister of War: Dalai Wang (formerly Dalai Peitzu).

Assistant Minister of War: Sait Südjiet Kung.

Minister of Justice: Erdeni Wang.

Minister of Finance: Tushetu Wang.

In general, the political outlook, from the Mongol point of view, can only be regarded most pessimistically. The Mongols have no men who are not utterly ignorant. The Khalkhas as a whole have little national feeling upon which to found a State. There is much evidence in support of the view that the Mongol race is fast dying out altogether. The Russian, no less than the Chinese, really entertains the greatest contempt for the Mongol, and the latter is beginning to realise this. In my opinion this contempt is thoroughly well deserved because of the extraordinary laziness, lack of enterprise and all ambition, and the moral and physical filthiness of the Mongol race.

Before passing on to consider the conclusions to be drawn from the above political and commercial situation and the relation it has to British interests, it is necessary to note some facts in regard to three special areas, Barga, Kobdo, and Urianghai.

1. In Barga, in addition to the discontent at the dearth and scarcity of goods, there was evident a decided feeling in favour of the restoration of the Ta Ch'ings. This is to be attributed to the following circumstances. Under the Ta Ch'ings the Barguts constituted banner-men and received allowances as such. Since the *coup d'État* these allowances have naturally ceased to be paid and instead of receiving money, Barga is now called upon to contribute her share to the expense of the new Mongol Government.

Again, suspicions are entertained with regard to Russian sincerity. It is pointed out that for 200 years the Barguts lived in peace under the Ta Ch'ings. The Russians never had much dealing with the Barguts until 1911 when they suddenly proclaimed themselves the devoted friends of Barga.

I may add:—

(1.) I have heard plenty of evidence confirming the already reported accounts of the active part taken by Russia in the secession of Barga in January 1912; and

(2.) That Colonel Baranoff's pamphlet on Barga, the only existing work on this area, contains a great deal that is not correct;

(3.) At the time of my visit to Hailar, the Amban Sheng-fu was engaged in trying to obtain from the Russians control over the Chinese in the railway settlements, who, he complained, acted as spies for Peking and over whose persons he has at present no power.

2. Kobdo district: From Sait Südjiet Kung I learnt the following:—

The three chief men in Kobdo are Jahantza Lama (evidently the same as Cha (I) (Ja Lama), spoken of in a letter written by a German traveller shown last summer by the German military attaché to the British military attaché), Danbei Jantsang Lama, and Bayir Taiji.

All the Kobdo leaders, except Bayir Taiji are pacifist and inclined to settle matters with China by compromise. Bayir Taiji alone stands for the military policy. He is watching with his troops the passes through the Mongolian Altai. This confirms former information.

3. With reference to the Urianghai district, which I have formerly pointed out would be almost wholly annexed to Siberia, it is interesting to note—

(a.) That on a map by the Irkutsk General Staff which I saw in the cabinet of M. Miller, the broad red line marking the Imperial boundary passed to the south of the Urianghai area, an alternative line of equal prominence passing along the former Imperial frontier to the north; and

(b.) That a Russian merchant exploiting the fisheries in Urianghai said that the administration there had already been taken over by Russian officials. After cross-questioning this merchant, I convinced myself that the statement was not true, but it probably indicates that the transfer is imminent;

(c.) M. Pokrovsky told me that he believed that it was already definitely settled that Urianghai was to be recognised as Russian territory.

Finally, a word as to the Japanese.

Throughout my route I saw no signs of Japanese activity except at Hailar where there were some fifty to sixty Japanese including the usual quota of prostitutes, chemists, dentists, and doctors. From Russian sources I learnt that in the Cherim league of Eastern Mongolia the Japanese had quite failed to make any headway in trade against the Chinese.

In September a Japanese highly posted in the employ of the South Manchurian Railway Company visited Urga. Sheng Yun, who received a visit from him, told me that he came to reconnoitre as to the possible development of Japanese economic interests in Mongolia.

The Relation of the Politico-Economic Situation to British Interests.

Chinese trade having been dealt a very serious blow and Russian trading circles being incapable of filling the place vacated by the Chinese, there remains a splendid opportunity for the extension of the trade of those Powers who already have large businesses in North China.

The advent of Western European trade in Mongolia may almost be said to be expected by the Russians. As explained above, it is earnestly desired by all the Mongol princes. Russian minor officials, struggling with small salaries to contend with the exorbitant prices demanded by their own tradesmen, would gladly see the opening of European shops. Even serious agents of Russian manufacturing firms said to me that foreign competition would be a blessing to them, as it might wake the Urga tradesmen up to fresh efforts. On the other hand, Russian officials consider that the advent of European competitors would mean the decisive and final collapse of all Russian trade. Colonel Mitrovo, fearing this event, is strongly advocating that the Government should itself take steps to have imported free of all duties via Vladivostok and Kiakhta those same English and American piece goods which have hitherto held sway in the Mongolian market and which it has been found impossible to oust with the products of Moscow. Colonel Mitrovo told me frankly that he believed for many years to come Russian manufacturers cannot possibly supply Mongolia.

Again, another scheme which is mooted by the Russians as a means for themselves trading with our goods as Urga is to open up a new commercial highway from Manchuria station to Urga via the Kerulen valley. This would avoid passing the Russian Customs. But there would be the freight charges by railway from Tien-tsin or wherever the goods were acquired, and then a cart journey perhaps even slightly longer than that from Kalgan. It is persistently reported that a company (called "Lloyd") is about to open automobile communication from Manchuria station to Urga both for goods and passenger traffic. Having regard to the fact that new means of communication are always "about to be commenced" for decades before they really are, this plan is not likely to be realised soon.

Again, M. Miller regarded the economic situation as hopeless, and it was evident that he expected foreign competition from the fact that the first question he put to me was: "When is a British consul coming to Urga?" Speaking of the Grant incident, M. Miller is reported to have said: "Another incident like this, and we shall have an English consul here."

In my own opinion, the scheme whereby Russians are to conquer the Mongolian market with English and American goods may be classed together with the already exploded plan for supplying Mongolia with Russian manufactures. The Russification and development of Siberia is too vast a task to allow of the Russian people being able to do much elsewhere in Mongolia. Russia will insist on remaining politically paramount in Mongolia, but she cannot insist upon preventing others from doing that which she herself is unable to do, namely, to develop and exploit Mongolia economically. There are only two possibilities in the future, which are :—

1. A complete reversion to the old state of things, whereby the Chinese will control all the trade, possibly with the innovation of reasonable customs dues ; or
2. The exploitation of the Mongolian market by English, American, German, or Japanese firms, working probably through Inner Mongol or Chinese servants.

Both Russians and Mongols would certainly prefer the latter alternative.

It is not the intention here to prove how well worth contending for is the Mongolian market, but I may quote the opinion of the Kiakhta frontier commissioner, who believes that when with patience Europeans have taught the Mongols how to improve the quantity and quality of their already vast wealth in live-stock and raw products, Mongolia will certainly be one of the world's chief markets for the purchase of these most important requirements of mankind. In the Russian Altai great success has attended the blending of Mongolian and Caucasian breeds of sheep. Already Russia has made a start in teaching the Mongols how to improve their stock and protect it from disease by the despatch of numerous flying and stationary veterinary parties into Mongolia.

I would also point out that the future value of the Mongolian market must not be judged by the present thinness of population. The greater part of Mongolia is a land fully suited to economic development and settled habitation, and later on, whatever may become of its present degenerate inhabitants, it will be peopled by one or other of the more virile and more industrious races which surround it.

The present scattered distribution of the population need not deter the trader, because the mobile Mongol has always been accustomed to go comparatively long distances to buy his requirements. This feature, however, makes the keeping of a trading establishment unsuited for Englishmen in person. But there are excellent opportunities for Indian British subjects as the actual serving personnel for British or British-Indian firms.

It should be noted that the anti-Chinese dues levied by the Mongols affect our trade. They diminish the sale of our goods in Mongolia, and they increase the price at which our merchants in North China buy from the Chinese the raw produce which is obtained in exchange for our manufactured goods. The Chinese have to pay a tax of 1 tael on the purchase or sale of every ox or horse, 2 taels per camel, and 3 ch'ien of silver per sheep.

N.B.—I may add that, if required, I can supply any intending traders with lists of goods in use among the Mongols and much other detailed information as to Mongol trading customs and Mongol tastes, means of transport in Mongolia, wages, &c. Trade in Mongolia possesses quite peculiar characteristics, which must be understood to achieve success.

Register No.

125
13

Minute Paper.

4920

Secret Department.

2 letters from To. 53776
54123

Dated 3 } Dec 7. 1913.
Rec. 4 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	4 Dec.	WA	<p><u>Mongolia</u></p> <p>The Russo-Chinese Agreement. Text of Declaration, Notes, &c. Russian press comments.</p>
Secretary of State.....	7	P. W. H.	
Committee.....	5	—	
Under Secretary			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India - Dec 13 & 16 Jan 14.

FOR INFORMATION.

That the above Kenya says about the necessity for the economic development of Mongolia, is true mutatis mutandis of Tibet.

but the object in that case is to put really close relations between Russia & Mongolia"

25 Nov 13

Seen Pol. Com'ee,
9 DEC 1913

Previous Papers:—

4799
etc.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 53776

and address—


The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*


*and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,

December 3, 1913.



Reference to previous letter:



Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>British Commercial Attaché for Russia, November 27, 1913.</i>	<i>Russo-Chinese Agreement re Mongolia.</i>



(Similar letter sent to Board of Trade.)

py.

3776).

The recent Russo-Chinese Agreement concerning Mongolia, - The "Novoe Vremia" advocates the inclusion of Mongolia in the general Russian Customs Zone.

Commenting, in a leading article, on the recent conclusion of the Russo-Chinese Agreement with respect to Mongolia, the "Novoe Vremia" of St. Petersburg of November 10/23 thus concludes:

"At the same time it is evident that the autonomy of Mongolia, which Russia has undertaken to preserve against foreign attacks, can only be effective if the Government takes active measures for the economic development and civilization of this rich region. Meanwhile, almost daily comes news from Mongolia of the dangerous and unsatisfactory economic condition of the country. Owing to the Customs policy prevailing, the cost of living has enormously increased, and Russian trade there has assumed abnormal or monstrous forms. The independent political life of the new State calls forth numerous expenses, falling most heavily on the

the poorest classes. The new conditions have brought the Mongolians fresh burdens, without any evident advantages to bring them nearer to their protectress. It seems to us that one of the first steps towards effecting really close relations between Russia and Mongolia should be the inclusion of the latter in the general Russian Customs Zone. This would unshackle the clogs of Russian trade, and ease and expedite Russian enterprise in Mongolia. Without this finishing touch the work of the Chanceries will be fruitless. Now it is the turn of the Ministries of Finance, Commerce and Ways of Communication."

November 27th, 1913.

(Signed) Henry Cooke.
Commercial Attaché.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 34/23

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India

_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,


December 3, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

To India Office, Nov. 24, 1913 (52093).

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg No. 30 Treaty November 22, 1913.	Russo-Chinese Agreement re Outer Mongolia.



(Similar letter sent to)

No. 30 Treaty.

ST. PETERSBURG,

November 22nd., 1913 .

54123

DEC 1 1913

Sir ,

I have the honour to report that the
" Official Messenger " today published the Russian
text, and French translation of the following docu-
ments signed at Pekin on November 5th. 1913, regarding
Outer Mongolia.

(I) A Declaration signed by the Russian Minis-
ter at Pekin and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs

(II) A Note addressed by the Russian Minister
to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs .

(III) A Note addressed by the Chinese Minister
for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Minister .

Copies of the Declaration and Notes in ques-
tion are enclosed herewith .

I have the honour to be

with the highest respect,

Sir ,

your most obedient

humble servant

(signed)
Hugh O'Brien

The Right Honble.

Sir E. Grey Bart., K.G., M.P.

etc., etc., etc.

Copy to India
16 JAN 1914

ДѢЙСТВІЯ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА.

23-го октября 1913 г. между Россійскимъ посланникомъ въ Пекинѣ, д. с. с. Крупенскимъ и китайскимъ министромъ иностранныхъ дѣлъ Сун-Бао-ци состоялось подписаніе нижеслѣдующей деклараціи.

ДЕКЛАРАЦІЯ.

Въ виду того, что Императорское Россійское Правительство опредѣлило начала, которыя оно принимаетъ за основаніе своихъ отношеній къ Китаю касательно Внѣшней Монголіи, и правительство Китайской республики выразило свое сочувствіе сказаннымъ началамъ, оба Правительства условились о нижеслѣдующемъ:

I. Россія признаетъ, что Внѣшняя Монголія находится подъ сюзеренитетомъ Китая.

II. Китай признаетъ автономію Внѣшней Монголіи.

III. Признавая исключительное право монголовъ Внѣшней Монголіи самимъ вѣдать внутреннимъ управленіемъ автономной Монголіи и рѣшать всѣ касающіеся этой страны вопросы, относящіеся къ торговой и промышленной областямъ, Китай обязуется не вѣшиваться въ эти дѣла и посему не будетъ посылать войскъ во Внѣшнюю Монголію, не будетъ содержать тамъ никакихъ гражданскихъ или военныхъ властей и будетъ воздерживаться отъ всякой колонизаціи этой страны. Условлено, однако, что командированный китайскимъ правительствомъ сановникъ можетъ проживать въ Ургѣ, имѣя при себѣ необходимый подчиненный штатъ и конвой. Кромѣ того, китайское правительство, въ случаѣ надобности, можетъ содержать въ некоторыхъ мѣстностяхъ Внѣшней Монголіи, подлежащихъ опредѣленію при предусмотрѣнныхъ въ V статьѣ настоящаго соглашения переговорахъ, агентовъ для защиты интересовъ своихъ подданныхъ.

Россія, съ своей стороны, обязуется не содержать войскъ во Внѣшней Монголіи, за исключеніемъ консульскихъ конвоевъ, не вѣшиваться въ какую-либо отрасль управленія этой страны и воздерживаться отъ ея колонизаціи.

IV. Китай выражаетъ готовность принимать добрыя услуги Россіи для

установленія своихъ отношеній съ Внѣшней Монголіей, согласно вышеизложеннымъ началамъ и постановленіямъ русско-монгольскаго торговаго протокола 21-го октября 1912 года.

V. Касающіеся интересовъ Россіи и Китая во Внѣшней Монголіи вопросы, порождаемые новымъ положеніемъ вещей въ этой странѣ, составлять предметъ послѣдующихъ переговоровъ.

Въ удостовѣреніе чего, нижеподписавшіеся, надлежаще на то уполномоченные, подписали настоящую декларацію и приложили къ ней свои печати.

Учинено въ Пекинѣ, въ двойномъ экземплярѣ, двадцать третьяго октября (пятаго ноября) тысяча девятьсотъ тринадцатаго года, что соотвѣствуетъ пятому дню одиннадцатаго мѣсяца втораго года Китайской республики.

(Подп.) (Подп.)
В. Крупенскій. Сун-Бао-ци.
(М. П.) (М. П.)

Encl. in Mr O'Brien's Despatch
No 30 Treaty of Nov 22 1913

DECLARATION.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie ayant formulé les principes qu'il prenait pour base de ses relations avec la Chine concernant la Mongolie Extérieure, et le Gouvernement de la République Chinoise ayant exprimé son approbation desdits principes, les deux Gouvernements se sont entendus sur ce qui suit:

I. La Russie reconnaît, que la Mongolie Extérieure se trouve sous la suzeraineté de la Chine.

II. La Chine reconnaît l'autonomie de la Mongolie Extérieure.

III. Reconnaisant le droit exclusif des Mongols de la Mongolie Extérieure eux-mêmes de pourvoir à l'administration intérieure de la Mongolie autonome et de régier toutes les questions d'ordre commercial et industriel touchant à ce pays, la Chine s'engage à ne pas intervenir dans ces matières et par conséquent n'enverra pas en Mongolie Extérieure de troupes, n'y entretiendra aucun fonctionnaire civil ou militaire [et s'abstiendra de toute colonisation de ce pays. Il est cependant entendu qu'un dignitaire envoyé par le Gouvernement Chinois pourra résider à Ourga accompagné du personnel subalterne nécessaire et d'une escorte. En outre le Gouvernement Chinois pourra, en cas de besoin, entretenir dans certaines localités de la Mongolie Extérieure à définir au cours des pourparlers prévus à l'article V du présent accord, des agents pour la protection des intérêts de ses sujets la Russie de son côté s'engage à ne pas maintenir de troupes en Mongolie Extérieure à l'exception de gardes consulaires, à n'intervenir dans aucune partie de l'administration de ce pays et à s'abstenir de le coloniser.

IV. La Chine se déclare prête à accepter les bons offices de la Russie pour établir ses relations avec la Mongolie Extérieure conformément aux principes ci-dessus énoncés et aux stipulations du protocole commercial russo-mongol du 21 Octobre 1912.

V. Les questions, qui ont trait aux intérêts de la Russie et de la Chine dans la Mongolie Extérieure et qui sont créées par le nouvel état de choses dans ce pays, feront l'objet de pourparlers ultérieurs.

En foi de quoi les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé la présente Déclaration et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Pékin en double exemplaire le vingt-trois Octobre (cinq Novembre) mil neuf cent treize, correspondant au cinquième jour du onzième mois de la deuxième année de la République Chinoise.

(Signé) (Signé)
B. Kroupensky. Sun Pao-ki.
(L. S.) (L. S.)

При этомъ уполномоченные обмѣнялись нотами нижеслѣдующаго содержания.

Nov. 22 1913.

4123

Нота, переданная Российскимъ Императорскимъ посланникомъ въ Пекинъ китайскому министру иностранныхъ дѣлъ.

Приступая къ подписанію деклараціи отъ сего числа касательно Внѣшней Монголіи, нижеподписавшійся чрезвычайный посланникъ и полномочный министръ Его Величества Императора Всероссийскаго, надлежаще на то уполномоченный, имѣетъ честь заявить отъ имени своего Правительства его превосходительству господину Сунъ Бао-ци, министру иностранныхъ дѣлъ Китайской республики, нижеслѣдующее:

1) Россія признаетъ, что территорія Внѣшней Монголіи составляетъ часть территоріи Китая.

2) Что касается политическихъ и территоріальныхъ вопросовъ, то по нимъ китайское правительство будетъ улаживаться съ Русскимъ Правительствомъ путемъ переговоровъ, въ которыхъ власти Внѣшней Монголіи будутъ принимать участіе.

3) Предусмотрѣнныя въ V статьѣ деклараціи переговоры будутъ происходить между тремя заинтересованными сторонами, которыя въ этихъ видахъ изберутъ мѣсто, гдѣ съѣдутся ихъ делегаты.

4) Автономная Внѣшняя Монголія будетъ состоять изъ областей, находившихся въ вѣдѣніи китайскаго амбана въ Ургѣ, улусутайскаго цзян-цзюня и китайскаго амбана въ Кобдо. Въ виду того, что не существуетъ подробныхъ картъ Монголіи и что границы административныхъ дѣлений этой страны неопредѣленны, условлено, что точныя границы Внѣшней Монголіи, равно какъ и разграниченіе между Кобдоскимъ округомъ и Алтайскимъ округомъ, составятъ предметъ позднѣйшихъ переговоровъ, предусмотрѣнныхъ въ V статьѣ деклараціи.

Нижеподписавшійся пользуется настоящимъ случаемъ, чтобы возобновить его превосходительству господину Сунъ Бао-ци увѣренія въ своемъ глубокомъ почтеніи.

(Подп.) В. Крупенскій.

Пекинъ, 23-го октября (5-го ноября) 1913 года.

Переводъ.

Note adressée par le Ministre de Russie à Pékin au ministre des affaires étrangères de Chine.

En procédant à la signature de la Déclaration en date de ce jour ayant trait à la Mongolie Extérieure, le soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, dûment autorisé à cet effet, a l'honneur de déclarer au nom de son Gouvernement, à Son Excellence Monsieur Sun Pao-ki, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Chinoise ce qui suit:

1. La Russie reconnaît que le territoire de la Mongolie Extérieure fait partie du territoire de la Chine.

2. En ce qui concerne les questions d'ordre politique et territorial, le Gouvernement Chinois se mettra d'accord avec le Gouvernement Russe par des négociations auxquelles les autorités de la Mongolie Extérieure prendront part.

3. Les pourparlers prévus à l'article 5 de la Déclaration auront lieu entre les trois parties intéressées qui désigneront à cet effet un lieu pour la réunion de leurs délégués.

4. La Mongolie Extérieure autonome comprendra les régions qui ont été sous la juridiction de l'Amban chinois d'Ourga, du général tartare d'Ouliassoutai et de l'Amban chinois de Kobdo. Vu qu'il n'existe pas de cartes détaillées de la Mongolie et que les limites des divisions administratives de ce pays sont incertaines, il est convenu, que les limites exactes de la Mongolie Extérieure ainsi, que la délimitation entre le district de Kobdo et le district de l'Altai feront l'objet des pourparlers ultérieurs prévus à l'article V de la Déclaration.

Le soussigné saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à Son Excellence Monsieur Sun Pao-ki les assurances de sa très haute considération. (Signé) B. Krupensky.

Pekin, le 23 Octobre (5 Novembre) 1913.

Nov 22 1913

Нота, переданная китайскимъ министромъ иностранныхъ дѣлъ Россійскому Императорскому посланнику въ Пекинѣ.

Приступая къ подписанію деклараціи отъ сего числа касательно Внѣшней Монголіи, нижеподписавшійся, министръ иностранныхъ дѣлъ Китайской республики, надлежало на то уполномоченный, имѣть честь заявить отъ имени своего правительства его превосходительству господину Крупенскому, чрезвычайному посланнику и полномочному министру Его Величества Императора Всероссийскаго, нижеслѣдующее:

1. Россія признаетъ, что территорія Внѣшней Монголіи составляетъ часть территорія Китая.

2. Что касается политическихъ и территориальныхъ вопросовъ, то по нимъ китайское правительство будетъ улаживаться съ Россійскимъ Правительствомъ путемъ переговоровъ, въ которыхъ власти Внѣшней Монголіи будутъ принимать участие.

3. Предусмотрѣнные въ V статьѣ деклараціи переговоры будутъ происходить между тремя заинтересованными сторонами, которыя въ этихъ видахъ изберутъ мѣсто, гдѣ съѣдутся ихъ делегаты.

4. Автономная Внѣшняя Монголія будетъ состоять изъ областей, находящихся въ вѣдѣніи китайскаго амбана въ Ургѣ, уleysутайскаго цзянцзюня и китайскаго амбана въ Кобдо. Въ виду того, что не существуетъ подробныхъ картъ Монголіи и что границы административныхъ дѣленій этой страны неопредѣленны, условлено, что точныя границы Внѣшней Монголіи, равно какъ и разграниченіе между Кобдоскимъ округомъ и Алтайскимъ округомъ, составятъ предметъ позднѣйшихъ переговоровъ, предусмотрѣнныхъ въ V статьѣ деклараціи.

Нижеподписавшійся пользуется настоящимъ случаемъ, чтобы возобновить его превосходительству господину Крупенскому увѣренія въ своемъ глубокомъ почтеніи.

(Подп.) Сун-Бао-ци.

Пекинъ, 5-го числа 11-го мѣсяца 2-го года Китайской республики.

Переводъ.

Note adressée par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Chine au Ministre de Russie à Pékin.

En procédant à la signature de la Déclaration en date de ce jour ayant trait à la Mongolie Extérieure, le soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Chinoise, dûment autorisé à cet effet, a l'honneur de déclarer au nom de son Gouvernement à Son Excellence Monsieur Kroupensky, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, ce qui suit:

1. La Russie reconnaît que le territoire de la Mongolie Extérieure fait partie du territoire de la Chine.

2. En ce qui concerne les questions d'ordre politique et territorial, le Gouvernement Chinois se mettra d'accord avec le Gouvernement Russe par des négociations auxquelles les autorités de la Mongolie Extérieure prendront part.

3. Les pourparlers prévus à l'article V de la Déclaration auront lieu entre les trois parties intéressées, qui désigneront à cet effet un lieu pour la réunion de leurs délégués.

4. La Mongolie Extérieure autonome comprendra les régions, qui ont été sous la juridiction de l'Amban chinois d'Ourga, du Général tartare d'Ouliasoutai et de l'Amban chinois de Kobdo. Vu qu'il n'existe pas de cartes détaillées de la Mongolie et que les limites des divisions administratives de ce pays sont incertaines, il est convenu, que les limites exactes de la Mongolie Extérieure ainsi que la délimitation entre le district de Kobdo et le district de l'Altai feront l'objet des pourparlers ultérieurs prévus à l'article V de la Déclaration.

Le soussigné saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à Son Excellence Monsieur Kroupensky les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Signé: Sun Pao-ki.

Pékin, le 5-me jour du 11-ème mois de la 11-ème année de la République Chinoise.

44123

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1235

Register No.
L-200

~~Put away with~~

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 20

52093

Dated } 24 Nov. 1913.
Rec. "

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	26 Nov.	<i>Alt</i>	<i>Manchuria</i> <u>Text of Russo-Chinese Agreement</u>
Secretary of State.....	26	<i>T.W.H.</i>	
Committee.....	27	<i>E.</i>	
Under Secretary			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 28 Nov.

FOR INFORMATION.

The text of the agreement corresponds closely with the version telegraphed from Peking by Reuter on the 5th Nov. & published in the Morning Post of the following day (see extract below)

Secr. for Com'ee.,
2 DEC 1913

Previous Papers:—

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

India.

11/4614
52

No. 52093

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

Copy to India
28 NOV 1913

799


*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,

November 24, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Hon. Charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg No. 338 Conf. November 9, 1913.</i>	<i>Russo. Chinese Agreement re Mongolia</i> 

(Similar letter sent to

Copy.

No. 338.

(2007)

Confidential.

ST. PETERSBURG,

November 9th, 1913.

Sir:-

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 330 of the 30th ultimo, copy of the Declaration signed at Peking on October 23rd/November 5th 1913, by the Russian Minister at Peking and the Chinese Government respecting Mongolia.

In furnishing me with the text of this instrument, Monsieur Nératow requested that it might be treated as confidential until it should be published.

I have &c.,

(Signed)

Hugh O'Beirne.

The Right Honourable

Sir E. Grey, Bart., K.G., M.P.

&c., &c., &c.

Mr. Kroupensky, Ministre de Russie à Pékin, et Mr. Sun-pao-chi, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Chine ont signé le 23 Octobre/5 Novembre 1913 à Pékin une déclaration dont les clauses sont comme suit:-

I. La Russie reconnaît la suzeraineté du Gouvernement Chinois sur la Mongolie Extérieure.

II. La Chine reconnaît l'autonomie de la Mongolie Extérieure.

III. Reconnaisant le droit exclusif des Mongols eux-mêmes de pourvoir à l'administration intérieure de la Mongolie Extérieure autonome, et de régler toutes les questions d'ordre commercial et industriel touchant à ce pays, la Chine s'engage à ne pas intervenir dans ces matières et, par conséquent, n'enverra pas de troupes dans la Mongolie Extérieure, n'y entretiendra aucun fonctionnaire civil ou militaire et s'abstiendra de toute colonisation de ce pays. Il est cependant entendu qu'un dignitaire envoyé par le Gouvernement Chinois pourra résider à Ourga accompagné du personnel subalterne nécessaire et d'une escorte. En outre le Gouvernement Chinois, en cas de besoin, pourra entretenir dans certaines localités de la Mongolie Extérieure, à définir au cours des pourparlers prévus à l'article

Chinois d'Ourga, du Général Tartare d'Ouliassoutai et de l'Amban Chinois de Kobdo.

Vu qu'il n'existe pas de cartes détaillées de la Mongolie et que les limites des divisions administratives de ce pays sont incertaines, il est convenu que les limites exactes de la Mongolie Extérieure ainsi que la délimitation entre le district de Kobdo et le district de l'Altai, feront l'objet des pourparlers ultérieurs prévus à l'article V de la déclaration.

Il est entendu que les pourparlers prévus à l'article V de la déclaration auront lieu entre les trois parties intéressées, qui à cet effet désigneront un lieu pour la réunion de leurs délégués.

En ce qui concerne les questions d'ordre politique et territorial touchant à la Mongolie Extérieure le Gouvernement Chinois se mettra d'accord avec la Russie par des négociations auxquelles les autorités de la Mongolie Extérieure prendront part".

Ces deux documents devant être publiés prochainement par les parties contractantes, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de prier l'Ambassade d'Angleterre de considérer sa présente

communication

THE FUTURE OF MONGOLIA.

RUSSO-CHINESE TREATY SIGNED.

PEKING, Nov. 5.

The Russo-Chinese agreement regarding Mongolia was signed to-day. It says:

The Russian Government having formulated the principles constituting the basis of its relations with China regarding Outer Mongolia, and the Chinese Government having signified its approval thereof, the two Powers agree as follows:

(1) Russia recognises Outer Mongolia as being under the suzerainty of China.

(2) China recognises the autonomy of Outer Mongolia.

(3) Recognising the exclusive right of the Mongols of Outer Mongolia to administer their internal affairs and to settle all commercial and industrial questions concerning autonomous Mongolia, China will not maintain there either civil or military officials, and will abstain from all colonisation, it being understood, however, that a dignitary sent by the Chinese Government can reside in Urga, accompanied by the requisite subordinate staff and an escort. Also China may station in certain localities of Outer Mongolia, to be arranged subsequently, agents for the protection of the interests of her subjects. Russia, in turn, undertakes not to maintain troops in Outer Mongolia with the exception of Consular guards, nor to interfere with the administration, and to refrain from colonisation.

(4) China will accept the good offices of Russia to establish her relations with Outer Mongolia conformably with the above principles and the stipulations of the Convention of Urga concluded between Russia and Mongolia on November 3, 1912.

(5) Questions regarding the interests of China and Russia in Outer Mongolia arising from the new conditions will form the subject of subsequent negotiations.

The Notes exchanged are to the following effect:

(1) Russia recognises that the territory of Outer Mongolia forms part of Chinese territory.

(2) In any negotiations regarding political and territorial questions between the Chinese and Russian Governments, the authorities of Outer Mongolia will participate.

(3) All three parties will participate in the negotiations referred to in Article Five of the Declaration and designate the place of meeting.

(4) Autonomous Outer Mongolia will comprise the regions formerly under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban at Urga, the Tartar General at Uliasutai, and the Chinese Amban at Kobdo, but since no detailed maps exist and the boundaries are uncertain, it is agreed that the frontier of Outer Mongolia, together with the boundaries between Kobdo and the Altai Mountains shall be the subject of negotiations as provided in Article Five of the Declaration.

—*Reuter's Special Service.*

"Morning Post"

6th November 1913

Register No.

4614²

Put away with

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O. 50798

Dated 12 } 1913.
Rec. 13 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	13 Nov.	AK	<u>Russo-Chinese Agreement.</u> F.O. do not propose to instruct Mr. Alston to telegraph text to India (it having been correctly telegraphed by Reuter) unless it is still thought desirable
Secretary of State.....			
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Lead
13/11 9. W. H

Copy to F.O. (of tel^g to Viceroy) 19 Nov. '13
India (of F.O. letter)

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. telegram to Viceroy informing

13 November - telegram to Viceroy

Recd. Secy. Commr.,
25 NOV 1913

Previous Papers:—

4614²

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Despatched + 13 November 1913
Scopied
RHR

Foreign Secret. Your telegram of
6th Nov. ^{Agreement} Mongolian Treaty. See
Alston's telegram no. 246 8th
November. ^{I presume you are satisfied} ~~In the circumstances~~
Alston will not be instructed
to telegraph text of ^{agreement} ~~treaty~~ to
you unless particularly
desired.

S224

SNE

112

20651

DB

In any further communication
on this subject, please quote

No. 50798/13

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

Immediate.

4674
FOREIGN OFFICE

November 12, 1913.

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit
to you, herewith, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's
Chargé d'Affaires at Peking with respect to the recent
Russo Chinese Agreement on the subject of Mongolia.

In view of the information contained in this
telegram Sir E. Grey does not propose to instruct Mr.
Alston to telegraph the full text of the Agreement, as
suggested in your letter P. 4569, of the 8th instant,
unless Lord Crewe still considers that such a step is
necessary.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble Servant,

W. Langley

Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



CONFIDENTIAL

4614

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8, 11:30 A.M.)

Peking, November 8, 1913.

(November 8, 11:30 A.M.)

(No. 246. Very Confidential.) K.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 6th November.

I have obtained the text of the Russo-Chinese Agreement very confidentially from the Japanese Minister, as the Russian Minister declined to communicate it at present. I am posting copies to-day, and can telegraph it if desired, but I find that Reuter's version telegraphed to London on 5th November is verbatim correct. I understand that it will have been repeated to India from London.

The Russian Minister has shown me on Map 22, China, Inland Mission Series, that the frontier of Outer Mongolia, which comprises the four aimaks of Sassaktu, Sainnoin, Tu-che-tu, and Tsetsen, practically coincides with [?] boundaries as dotted on that map. Exact definition remains to be settled at the proposed conference, but the western frontier is, roughly, the Altai range. The southern frontier follows the dotted line in the middle of the Desert of Gobi.

(Sent to India.)

1235

Register No.

4569

Secret Department.

2 Letters from F.O.

Dated 6, 7 Nov. 1913.

Tel. from Vicaroy d. traced. 6 Nov.

Rec.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	7 Nov.	AA	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....			Russ-Chinese Agreement. G. of I.
Committee.....			ask that text may be telegraphed
Under Secretary.....			to them in full when complete
Secretary of State.....			version is available.

Copy to F.O. (of Vicaroy's letter)
 India (of F.O. letter & letter to F.O.) - 7/11

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

8/11 to F.O. asking that Peking Legation
 may be instructed accordingly.

8 November 1913 Letter to F.O.

Seen Pol. Comtee.,
 25 NOV 1913

Previous Papers:—

4468 etc

MINUTE.

The statement which the G. of I. attribute to Benter, viz:- that the Russo-Chinese Agreement contains a "rough definition" of the frontier of Outer Mongolia, is not supported by the other information available. Mr. Alston (telegram of 30 Oct.) reported that the boundaries of Mongolia & other details were reserved for settlement by a tripartite conference at Kiak^hta; and this is borne out by the Times special correspondent at Peking (see extract from Times of 6 Nov. below).

According to Mr. Alston's tel^m of 6th Nov. (which does not appear to have been repeated to India) the agreement is not to be published until ~~then~~ the originals (signed on 5th Nov. at Peking) have reached St. Petersburg. But in the meantime we may ask the F.O. to instruct Mr. Alston to telegraph the text to India as soon as it is available

8/11.70.

13000
Sir,

8 November 1913

In continuation of ^{my} Sir
~~A. Hatzfeldt's~~ letter of the 30th
Oct. 1913, No. P. 4450, as to
the reported Russo-Chinese
Agreement respecting Mongolia,
I am directed to inviteth
reference to the Viceroy's telegram
of the 6th inst.^x on the subject,
& to request that, if the S. &
S. for Foreign Affairs sees no
objection, H.M.'s Charge d'Affaires
may be instructed to telegraph
the full text of the agreement
direct to the G. of I., as soon
as he is in a position to do so.

x Copy communicated
to F.O., 7 Nov. 1913

Copy to India
12 NOV 1913

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM.


FROM Viceroy (+)
DATED 6 November 1913
RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 3.25 pm.

4669

Foreign Secret. Tibet Conference. If complete version of Russo-Chinese Agreement regarding Mongolia available we would be glad if it could be telegraphed to us in full. Details of the rough definition of frontier of Outer Mongolia, which Reuter reports is included in Agreement, would be especially useful, particularly so in regard to southern and western portions.

Repeated to Peking.

Copy to 40. 7 Nov 13



AUTONOMY OF OUTER MONGOLIA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)


PEKING, Nov. 5.

Joint declarations relative to Mongolia were signed to-day by the Russian Minister and the Chinese Foreign Minister. The autonomy of Outer Mongolia and Chinese suzerainty over it are recognized as well as the provisions of the Urga Convention protocol. It is stipulated that Mongolians shall be independent of China in matters relating to their trade and industries.

At the joint conference which is to be held at Kiakhta to arrange details and the essential question of the geographical definition of Outer Mongolia the Russian, Chinese, and Mongolian representatives will meet on an equality.

"Times",

6 Nov. 1913



CONFIDENTIAL.

4569

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received November 6, 2.15 P.M.)

Peking, November 6, 1913.

(No. 244.) R.


(November 6, 4.15 P.M.)

MY telegram No. 240 of 30th October.

Mongolian agreement signed 5th November. Text will be published after the originals have reached St. Petersburg.

Copy to India

14 NOV 1913



4569

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[October 6.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[45363]

No. 1.

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 365.)

Sir,

Peking, September 20, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received information from two British firms—Price's Candle Company and the British-American Tobacco Company—to the effect that the Mongolian Government are about to levy a high duty on all foreign goods except those of Russian origin. The firms in question are both doing an important and growing trade with the Mongols, the former in candles and the latter in all classes of goods in addition to tobacco. They have, up to the present, been in the habit of importing via Tien-tsin consignments of goods destined for the Mongolian market, which have been forwarded to Kalgan under transit pass, and conveyed thence across Mongolia without the payment of any further duties. I am now asked by these firms whether the treaty rights of British merchants have been changed by the recent Russian agreements with the Urga Government. In view of the fact that His Majesty's Government have not yet recognised any alteration of the *status quo*, I presume that British commercial rights remain unchanged. There exists, however, at the present moment no practical method of enforcing them. The Chinese Government have entirely lost control of Outer Mongolia, and are barely holding their own against Mongol raids in Inner. Their hold even on the district round Kalgan was for a time so precarious that the issue of transit passes to cover goods up to that point was temporarily suspended during the month of July. It is, under these circumstances, clearly useless to approach the Chinese Government on the subject, nor is it possible to bring pressure to bear on the Urga Government otherwise than through the Russians.

It is not improbable that Mongolia may eventually furnish an important field for commercial enterprise. The above-mentioned British firms are already in possession of an organisation which would enable them to profit by any commercial expansion which may take place, but they inform me that the levy of import duties of the kind foreshadowed by their agent at Urga would immediately kill the trade which they have worked up in that district.



The Russian Legation here deny all knowledge of the subject, and, in replying to Messrs. Price and to the British-American Tobacco Company, I have confined myself to stating that I am without information regarding the rumoured imposition of import duties, but that I have referred the question to you.

I would venture to suggest that I may be placed in possession of the views of His Majesty's Government on this question, and to ask whether, in order to allay the natural anxiety felt by the two firms, I may be authorised to inform them that, in any future arrangement made between His Majesty's Government and Russia regarding the status of Mongolia, the former will not permit the establishment of a prohibitive tariff in favour of Russian goods.

I have, &c.

B. ALSTON.

[1918 f-1]



THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

4569
13
[October 6.]

SECTION 1.

[45363]

No. 1.

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 365.)

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
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I have, &c.

B. ALSTON.

[1918 f-1]

*Circulated with
4614/13*



1235
13

Register No.
4468

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 20

Dated *30* } *Oct* 1913.
Rec. *31* }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>31 Oct.</i>	<i>W.A.</i>	<i>Mongolia</i> <i>Terms of Russo-Chinese agreement.</i>
Secretary of State..	<i>31</i>	<i>P.W.A.</i>	
Committee.....	<i>1 XI 13</i>	<i>E</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to

FOR INFORMATION.

*These very closely resemble the British
terms for Tibet.*

*Seen Pol force
25 Nov 1913*

Previous Papers:—
4450

CONFIDENTIAL.

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30, 10.15 A.M.)

(No. 240.)

Peking, October 30, 1913.

(October 30, 9.8 A.M.)

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram of 28th October.

Terms of Russo-Chinese Agreement, which it is hoped to sign next week, include:—


Recognition of Chinese suzerainty and of Mongolian autonomy.

No Chinese administration, troops, or colonisation admitted.

This does not preclude Chinese Resident at Urga and other places to be decided upon later. Industrial and commercial questions to be left to Mongolia, in accordance with the Urga protocol of 1912.

Boundaries, outer and inner, of Mongolia and other details to be arranged definitely at a tripartite conference to be held probably at Kiakhta.

(Repeated to India.)



Register No.

4450

1235

B

Secret Department.

Tel.
Letter from VicenoyDated 28 } Oct. 1913.
Rec. 29 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	29 Oct.	WA	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....			Enquiry from G. of I. regarding reported Russo-Chinese agreement.
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to Sec. 29 Oct 1913

Copy to India
31 OCT 1913

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Att. letter to I.O. asking for information

30 Oct. 1913. Letter to Sec.

Seen Pol Comr
25 Nov 1913

Previous Papers:—

3632

U. S. of S.

J.O.

- Col. sent to 70,
29 Oct 1913

Sir,

30 Oct 1913

With reference to the telegram from
the S. of S. of 28th inst. on the subject
of the ^{reported} Russo Chinese agreement regarding
Mongolia, I am directed by the S. of
S. for S. to request that, if Sir E.
Grey sees no objection, the S. of S. &
this Office may be furnished with such
information as may be obtainable.

44 3632

18120. L. 694. 10,000.—5/1913. [981/12.]


Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM

DATED

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE



Copy to 570
29-10-1913

[Faint, mostly illegible handwritten text, likely the content of the telegram.]



"Times" 24 Oct 13.

MONGOLIAN AUTONOMY.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

PEKING, OCT. 23.

The Russian Minister and the Chinese Foreign Minister to-day practically reached an agreement on the terms of the declarations with regard to Mongolia, which will be exchanged by the two Powers. The declarations will embody the principles involved in the Urga Convention, and will secure to Russia the privileges set forth in the protocol accompanying the Convention. Chinese suzerainty will be acknowledged on the Russian side, and on the other China agrees to recognize the autonomy of Mongolia and to refrain from colonization or military occupation.

The knotty point of the geographical definition of autonomous Mongolia, as well as other important matters, remains for discussion at the three-cornered conference which it has been decided to hold forthwith at Kiakhta. While China now appears prepared to accept the *fait accompli* in Mongolia, there still remains a wide gulf between Russian and Chinese ideas of the regions to which the new arrangement applies, and long outdrawn negotiations at Kiakhta may be expected.

Put away with 1235

Register No.

3532

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 70. 29106

Dated } 2 Dec 1913.
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	3 Sept.	J.E.S.	<u>Mongolia</u> Russian Consul General at Ulaan given the title of "Diplomatic Agent" accredited to the Mongolian Government
Secretary of State.....			
Committee.....	4	LT	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

Copy to India
12 SEP 1913

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol. Comtee.,
8 SEP 1913

Previous Papers:— 3494

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 39106

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

3494

3001

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,

September 2, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H. Ambassador at St Petersburg No. 248 August 14/13</i>	<i>Mr. Miller made Russian Diplomatic Agent accredited to Mouphian Sov</i>

(Similar letter sent to

No. 248

3002

St. Petersburg,

1913

August 14th., 1913.

Sir,

3010

I have the honour to inform you that, according to a statement published in the "Novoe Vremya", the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs has decided to give Mr. Miller, the present Consul General at Urga the title of Diplomatic Agent accredited to the Mongolian Government. He will continue to reside at Urga.

I have the honour to be

with the highest respect

Sir,

your most obedient

humble servant

(signed)

George W. Buchanan

The Right Honble.

Sir E. Grey Bart. K.G., L.S.

etc. etc. etc.

Put away with 1235
13

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[July 18.]

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

(33615) Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 18, 1913.

M. SAZONOF télégraphie d'urgence:—

"Saint-Petersbourg, le 1^{er} (14) juillet, 1913.

"En vue de faciliter au Gouvernement chinois la conclusion d'un accord avec la Russie concernant la Mongolie, nous avons été au-devant de ses souhaits en atténuant la rédaction des articles qui lui imposent des restrictions, mais en soulignant, toutefois, que nous insistons sur les engagements que les traités imposaient à la Chine.

"Il se trouve que notre désir de ménager l'amour-propre des Chinois a été mal interprété par lui au cours des pourparlers, des déclarations ministérielles et des débats parlementaires, et nous avons acquis la conviction que la Chine, se basant sur certains termes du traité, l'interprétait dans le sens d'un retour complet de la Mongolie vers l'ancien ordre de choses. En conséquence de quoi, et considérant que la signature d'un accord ne contribuera qu'à accentuer les malentendus, nous préférons décliner les dernières propositions du Gouvernement chinois, qui visent une nouvelle modification de ladite rédaction et rompre les pourparlers en ne consentant à les reprendre qu'à la condition d'une déclaration nette et claire, de part et d'autre, au sujet de leur point de vue dominant sur la question de Mongolie. Dans notre conviction, ce point de vue consiste à reconnaître la suzeraineté de la Chine vis-à-vis de la Mongolie, laissant à cette dernière la jouissance d'une autonomie dans les limites indiquées par l'accord russe et le protocole de 1912. La Chine devra accepter les bons office de la Russie pour le règlement réciproque de ses rapports avec la Mongolie.


"Veuillez prévenir sans délai le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique qu'une communication dans ce sens a été faite le 30 juin au Gouvernement chinois, et ajouter que nous n'avons aucune intention de nous désister d'un programme dont un des points essentiels est le maintien d'un lien juridique entre la Chine et la Mongolie.

"Nous avons acquis la conviction qu'il est nécessaire de dissiper le malentendu que le Gouvernement chinois a introduit dans le vrai sens du nouvel état des choses créé en Mongolie par suite du dernier coup d'État.

"Une atmosphère de ce genre ne permettant pas au nouveau Gouvernement de remplir consciencieusement les engagements découlant des traités, nous faisons la démarche actuelle dans le but d'éclaircir la vraie portée de la question, afin de parvenir, d'accord avec la Chine, à un règlement définitif et tout amical de cette affaire."

[2994 s-2]

Put by
J.S.
26/8/13.



22 AUG 1913

3043/12
THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[July 31.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy
SECTION 1.

[35437]

No. 1.

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 290.)

Peking, July 15, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the following incident which occurred at the beginning of this month, and which illustrates the ease with which the Russian Government are able to bring successful pressure to bear on China for the settlement of pending questions.

Two cases of aggressions by Chinese on Russian subjects having recently occurred in the neighbourhood of Tsitsihar, the Russian Minister at Peking demanded immediate satisfaction in the form of dismissal of the officials concerned, monetary compensation, and apologies. There were also two further cases in connection with the detention of Russian cattle-dealers proceeding to Dolonor and with the opening of Russian mail-bags near Kalgan, for which compensation and apologies were likewise demanded.

The Russian Minister soon saw that the Wai-chiao Pu intended to adopt in the settlement of these cases their usual policy of procrastination and helplessness, and he therefore resolved upon sterner measures to bring the Chinese authorities to a sense of their responsibilities. M. Kroupensky accordingly informed the Wai-chiao Pu that the patience of his Government was exhausted, and that if the offending Tutu of Tsitsihar were not promptly removed and compensation duly granted the Russian authorities would take the matter into their own hands. His Excellency took the opportunity of including in his demands the dismissal of the Kashgar intendant as satisfaction for the Chira incident of last summer.

Secret orders were then sent to General Sitcheffsky at Harbin, and some 6,000 to 8,000 Russian troops were concentrated at the station of Fuliardi, a few miles to the west of Tsitsihar, ready for immediate action. The above movement of troops speedily produced the desired effect, and the Russian Minister was informed that all his demands had been granted.

The proposed Russo-Chinese agreement regarding Mongolia has now been rejected by the Senate; moreover, the Russian Minister, on the plea that the wording of the text has been altered, no longer shows any disposition to agree to the draft in its present form, and has informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is now necessary to make an entirely fresh start. The continuation of the present unsettled state of affairs in Mongolia is of little injury to Russian interests, whereas it considerably hampers the action of the Central Government by retaining on the border large numbers of troops which might otherwise become available in the struggle with the South.

I have, &c.

B. ALSTON.

Register No.

Put away with

1235

13

3307

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 70, No. 35681

Dated 14 } August 1913.
Rec. 15 }

Date.

Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 18 Aug

A.H.

Secretary of State..... 18

J.H.H.

Committee..... 20

C.

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia

The Russo-Chinese negotiations.

Action of the Chambers at Peking: revised
proposals by Russia

Copy to India, 15 Aug. 1913

FOR INFORMATION.

It is to be feared that we may have similar difficulties with the Chinese Chambers over our new Tibet agreement - if we succeed in negotiating one in India.

Seen Pol. Com'ee.,
17 AUG 1913

Previous Papers:—


3052

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 35681

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.



*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*

_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

August 14, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Hon. Charge d'Affaires at Peking No. 295. July 19, 1913.</i>	<i>Mongolia</i>

(Similar letter sent to

PEKING.

19th July, 1913.

Sir:-

2516

In his despatch No. 228 of June 2nd, Sir John Jordan had the honour to forward to you the text of a draft agreement between Russia and China for the settlement of the Mongolian question.

This draft agreement was studied by a special Committee of the Lower House, which recommended several important amendments. The chief points with regard to which further information was required were the exact boundaries of Outer Mongolia and the numbers of the Russian Consular Guards. Many other verbal alterations were also introduced. The agreement thus amended was finally passed by the Lower House and sent up to the Senate. Every argument was brought to bear to induce its acceptance by the latter Body, especially the necessity for a speedy settlement of the Mongolia difficulty in order to meet with full force the growing dissatisfaction in the South. Nevertheless on the 15th instant

Right Honourable

Sir E. Grey, Bart., K.G.,

&c., &c., &c.

instant the Senate rejected the draft agreement. The Russian Minister, however, had anticipated this move. Two days previously, acting on instructions from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Kroupensky informed the Wai Chiao Pu that the sense of the proposed agreement having been changed by the amendments of the Lower House, he could no longer agree to its terms. He proposed instead an exchange of notes on the basis of the enclosed draft. These fresh proposals consist of four clauses: by the first China recognises the autonomy of Outer Mongolia; by the second Russia recognises the Suzerainty of China over Mongolia; by the third Russia obtains all the benefits of the Urga Protocol (which document confers upon Russia all the rights she really desires); and the fourth leaves all questions arising out of the new state of affairs to be settled by further negotiation.

The Chinese Cabinet yesterday made overtures to the Russian Legation with a view to the acceptance of the old draft in its original form, but the Russian Minister has informed them that it is now too late to reopen a discussion on this basis.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile, the "Peking Daily News" of to-day publishes a Manifesto issued by the Alliance of Mongolian Princes, in which it is declared that the rejection by the Senate of the draft agreement with Russia was deliberately brought about by the Opposition in order to embarrass the Central Government and to handicap its movements in the struggle with the South. They therefore declare that they will withdraw their membership from the House and return to Mongolia; and that they will no longer be deceived by such empty phrases as "The Five Races of the Republic".

I have &c.,

(Signed)

B. Alston.

Russian Proposals of July 13th, 1913.

La Chine reconnaît l'autonomie de la Mongolie (à l'exclusion des territoires qui font partie de la Mongolie Intérieure) et les droits qui en découlent pour ce pays.

La Russie reconnaît la suzeraineté de la Chine sur la Mongolie et les droits qui s'y rattachent.

La Chine se déclare prête à accepter les bons offices de la Russie pour établir ses relations avec le Gouvernement Mongol en prenant pour base les principes énoncés dans l'accord et le Protocole Russo-Mongole du 21 Octobre, 1912.

Les questions qui ont trait aux intérêts de la Russie et de la Chine dans la Mongolie et qui sont créées par le nouvel état de choses dans ce pays feront l'objet de pourparlers ultérieurs entre les deux Gouvernements.

Register No.

3052

Put away with 1235

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from

70.

Dated 28th Aug 1913.
Rec. 29th Aug

Date.

Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 30 July Act

Secretary of State..... 31 July

Committee / VIII E

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia

Russian Official Communiqué regarding
breakdown of negotiations with China

Copy to

India - See in them

FOR INFORMATION.

This shows the kind of thing we may
expect at Simla - & the remedy, which,
however, in our case it ^{may} not be quite so
easy to apply.

It may be a useful
precedent for the India
for, if the Chinese
were impracticable

P. W. H.

Seen Pol. Com'ee.,
6 AUG 1913

Previous Papers:—


2748

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 334 32

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.



*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*

— and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

July 28, 1913.

Reference to previous letter :

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H.M. Ambassador at St. Petersburg No. 217 July 17, 1913.</i>	<i>Mongolia.</i>

221 TO IND

(Similar letter sent to

)

copy.

ST. PETERSBURG.

17th. July, 1913.

o. 17.

33432).

Sir:-

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the translation of a communiqué published in the "Official Messenger" respecting the negotiations which have been proceeding between the Russian and Chinese Governments on the subject of Mongolia.

In a conversation which I had with Monsieur Sazonov yesterday, His Excellency remarked that Russia had been compelled to conclude her Agreement with Mongolia in order to safeguard her interests and to secure the observance of the rights and privileges, which she had acquired under the Treaty of 1881. She had repeatedly offered to recognise China's Suzerainty over Mongolia in return for the former's recognition of Mongolian autonomy and as it was greatly to China's advantage to have her Suzerainty recognised by Russia the Chinese Government must be held responsible for the

breakdown

E. Grey, Bart., K.G., M.P.,

&c., &c., &c.

breakdown of the negotiations. Russia, His Excellency
added, desired to secure autonomy for Mongolia but not in-
dependence.

I have &c.,

(For the Ambassador)

(Signed) Nevile Henderson.

Translation of a "Communiqué" published in the "Official Messenger" dated 3rd/16th. July, 1913.

"On the 30th. June/13th. July, 1913 the Russian Minister in Peking made the following statement, in the name of the Imperial Government, to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs:-

"The Imperial Government upon the commencement of 'pourparlers' respecting the Mongol Question gave the Chinese Government clearly to understand that these negotiations must be based on the principles laid down by the Russo-Mongol Agreement and Protocol of 1912 - namely - maintenance of the juridical tie between China and Mongolia, and the bestowal on the latter, by virtue of the national federation she has attained, of complete autonomy, in particular the right to possess her own administration, to maintain her own troops, and the prohibition of Chinese colonisation of Mongol territories. Moreover, we have repeatedly pointed out that we cannot abandon these principles because we are convinced that only by their observance will the Mongol Question cease to be a source of misunderstanding between Russia and China,

and

and because we are bound by our obligations undertaken towards Mongolia to secure her the privileges above mentioned.

While making generous concessions to Chinese wishes respecting the form of the Treaty drawn up, we have never ceased to emphasise that such amendments cannot, in our opinion, affect the substance of the Agreement which remains unalterable. Meanwhile, we have with regret become convinced from the course of the negotiations that the Chinese Government regard the matter entirely otherwise, and hope by textual amendments to insert other matter in the treaty. As an instance in this respect may be quoted insistence on the deletion from the text of the treaty of the term "central authority" in application to the supreme organs of Mongol administration, on the plea that this expression translated into the Chinese language may give rise to misunderstandings. The baselessness of this contention, taking the French text as a guide, is evident, and, as has been disclosed from explanations between the plenipotentiaries, this textual amendment covers an intention to reduce Mongolia to her former position of a combination of individual, loosely connected principalities and to abolish the connecting authority of the Khutukhta and the Council of Ministers.

The

The lack of openness on the part of the Chinese Government has led Chinese public opinion entirely to misinterpret the true significance of the projected agreement, and to cause it to regard it as tantamount to a complete restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia. This false idea has found expression in the parliament and in the press. The Chinese Government have even deemed it possible to lay before the Russian plenipotentiary such proposals as prohibition of colonisation of Mongol territories for all except Mongols and the Chinese, the subordination of Mongol troops to Chinese officers, &c., notwithstanding that the text of the corresponding articles had already been determined in a contrary sense.

An agreement embracing so wide a range of questions of first importance as the Mongol Agreement can attain its aim only if both parties alike understand its general spirit and idea, because it is possible, on the basis of isolated phrases and words, to arrive with equal success at entirely different deductions as regards separate enactments of an agreement if its leading ideas are not kept in view.

It is to be feared therefore that immediately following

following upon application of the treaty the widest differences of opinion between the contracting parties would reveal themselves upon almost every point.

Under these conditions the signature of the treaty, from which date the removal of all future misunderstanding is expected, threatens to serve merely as the commencement of more acute differences.

For this reason, the Imperial Government, in rejecting the latest proposals of China respecting separate amendments of the text, are compelled with sincere regret to acknowledge that the negotiations have not led to the desired results, and they resume their freedom of action in this question.

However, the Government, in the most positive manner, affirm that in principle they do not in the least abandon their opinion as to the desirability of a friendly settlement of the question in dispute, and they are prepared to renew negotiations immediately upon the receipt of assurances that the views of Russia and China respecting the method of a settlement of the Mongol Question coincide in their fundamental features and give hope of the possibility of a practical delimitation of their mutual interests on this ground.

ground.

The Imperial Government consider that the best method of securing this result would be by a mutual exchange of declarations embodying the common point of view of the two States as to the line to be followed in dealing with this question. The following could serve as the basis of these declarations:-

China to recognise the autonomy of Mongolia (with the exception of the provinces forming part of Inner Mongolia), and the rights accruing to that country from such autonomy.

Russia to recognise the suzerainty of China over Mongolia and the rights connected with such suzerainty.

China to declare her readiness to accept the friendly services of Russia in the establishment of her relations with the Mongol Government, which relations shall be based on the principles expressed in the Russo-Mongol Agreement and Protocol of 21st October/3rd November 1912.

Questions affecting the interests of Russia and China in Mongolia and arising from the new situation in that country to serve as a subject for further consideration

consideration between the two Governments.

In conclusion, the Imperial Government deem it necessary to point out that until the establishment of some agreement with China their relations with Mongolia as of late, will be determined by the Agreements which have been made with the latter and in accordance with the principles arising from these Agreements."

Register No.

Put away with 1235

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 50 2088

Dated 7 Dec 1913.
Rec. 62

Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	10 July AA	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....	10 J.W.H.	
Committee.....	11 E.	Russia, China, & Japan.
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State.....		

Copy to India COPY TO INDIA

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol Comtee.
15 JUL 1913

Previous Papers:— 2727 etc

2516

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 29881

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

2727
2516
27
2146
1913

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*

—and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

July 9, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H. H. Ambassador at Tokio No. 152 Confidential June 11, 1913.	Russian Activity in Mongolia

(Similar letter sent to

NO. 152.

(Duplicate)

CONFIDENTIAL.

TOKIO,

25381

June 11, 1913.

Sir:-

With reference to my telegram No. 51 of the 30th ultime, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, copy of a memorandum by Mr. Rumbold, Councillor of His Majesty's Embassy, giving the substance of two conversations which he has recently had with Baron Makino, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of Russian activity in Mongolia.

Rumbold
June 9.
1913.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect, Sir,

Your most obedient

humble servant

(Signed) Conyngham Greene

Right Honourable,

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., K.G.,

etc., etc., etc.

Duplicate held in Sir. Greene No. 1512

Confidential.

Memorandum.

23381

of June 11 1913.

JUN 11 1913

I have recently had two short conversations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the Mongolian question.

The first of these conversations took place on May 30th on my return from my short visit to Peking. On that occasion the Minister himself raised the question by enquiring what view Sir John Jordan took on the subject. I replied that Sir John had not specially alluded to Mongolia during my stay at Peking. The impression I had derived generally was that our Legation were somewhat puzzled by the activity shown by Russia in Mongolian affairs - as evidenced by the conclusion of the Mongolian Agreement - and that the Russian action was inspired by a desire to forestall or counter any aggressive move on the part of China of which they were nervous. Baron Makino

said that that was also the view of the Japanese Government. He had instructed the Japanese Ambassador at St. Petersburg to reassure the Russian Government as to Chinese intentions and to say that there was no ground for apprehension on the part of Russia. He had also held the same language to the Russian Ambassador here, who had, on two or three occasions, mentioned the subject.

Baron Makino seemed to think that the Russian Government were influenced by somewhat alarmist reports as to Chinese intentions from their officers in North Manchuria and on the borders of Mongolia, who were unduly active. He quoted as an example of such reports the rumoured design of the Chinese to cut the trans-Siberian railway.

I saw the Minister again on June 7th and enquired whether it was true - as reported in the press - that the National Assembly at Peking had been discussing a Russo-Chinese

Convention

Convention about Mongolia. He said that the news was accurate, and I understood him^m to say that the terms of the Convention were much as stated in the newspapers. He observed that the Russians had greatly modified their attitude vis-à-vis China proper since the conclusion of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and had put much water in their wine. Baron Makino thought that this was owing to the desire of Russia to get a difficult question out of the way as also in view of the forthcoming recognition of the Chinese Republic. If the Russians were to make their recognition of the Republic dependent on the acquiescence of China in the proposed Russo-Mongolian arrangements, they might, at a given moment, find themselves isolated on the recognition question - other Powers being willing to recognise the Republic without demanding a quid pro quo - other than the usual guarantees. He thought that the proposed terms of the Russo-Chinese Convention were the best the Chinese would get.

Mongolian affairs have rarely been discussed between the Foreign Office here and this Embassy, and the fact that the Minister himself initiated the discussion would appear to show that Russian activity in Mongolia is preoccupying this Government.

Tokyo,

June 9th, 1913.

Register No.

Put away with

Minute Paper.

3727

Secret Department.

2 Letters from 70.

Dated 3, 5, July 1915.
Rec. 3, 6, July 1915.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	9 July	at	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....	9	P. W. H.	
Committee.....	10	<u>C.</u>	Military report on situation in Inner Mongolia
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India - see within

FOR INFORMATION.

Secy Ppl Comd'g.
15 JUL 1913

Previous Papers:—

2515
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JC

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

2727
1913

[May 31.]

SECTION 1.

[25042]

No. 1.

Sir C. Greene to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tokyo, May 30, 1913.



RUSSIAN activity in Mongolia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Japanese Government have represented at St. Petersburg that Russian suspicions as to intended aggression of Chinese are unfounded. He has held the same language to the Russian Ambassador here, who had mentioned the subject on two or three occasions.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs attributes uneasiness of Russians to certain over-active military commanders in regions concerned, who spread exaggerated reports about the designs of the Chinese, such, for instance, as the [group undecypherable] endeavour of the latter to cut the Trans-Siberian Railway.

(Sent to Peking.)

[2924 hh—1]



In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 29213

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

29213
1913

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,

July 5, 1913.

Reference to previous letter.

*See India -
see end of
Hilton Attache's
memo.*

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Hon. - Changid Affair at Peking No. 249 June 12, 1913.</i>	<i>Situation in Inner Mongolia</i>
<i>6 JUL 1913</i>	

(Similar letter sent to

)

29213

JUN 26 1913

Shanghai. June 12, 1913,

No. 249.

Sir,

Military Attaché.

Report No. 7

June 6.

With reference to my Despatch No. 114
of March 14, 1913, I have the honour to
transmit herewith for your information, and with a
view to its communication to the War Office, copy of
a report, as marked in the margin, which has been
addressed to me by the Military Attaché at His
Majesty's Legation respecting the situation in Inner
Mongolia.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir

Your most obedient, humble servant,

B. Alston.

(signed) ~~J.H. Jordan.~~

The Right Honourable

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M. P.

etc., etc., etc.,

Subject:- MILITARY SITUATION IN EASTERN MONGOLIA.

29213

JUN 26 1913

Report 7/1913

From Military Attaché, Peking.

6th June 1913

The following notes are drawn up from a conversation with Sir S. Head, 3rd Secretary to the Legation, as a result of a visit to Kalgan on the 1st inst. by Sir S. Head, 3rd Secretary to the Legation.

The information as to what has been taking place in Mongolia is very vague, but the local conditions are such that reliable information is practically impossible to obtain. The Chinese troops are guarding all the passes leading into Mongolia, and no foreigners are allowed to pass through the frontier. Travel is practically prohibited in Kalgan, even if it were possible to pass the line of pickets, and Mongols cannot be relied on to act as guides. We endeavored without success to obtain permission from the Chinese authorities to proceed a little distance from Kalgan, but were informed that we could only be allowed to go about a mile out of the city. The result is that we were not able to obtain any first-hand information except as to the situation at Kalgan, and were dependent for information as to events in Mongolia on reports from local residents and from Chinese and Mongol sources. The Chinese who resided in Inner Mongolia, but temporarily in Kalgan owing to the troubles, have little information to give, having apparently come into Kalgan before the Mongols appeared in force near their frontier. Mr. F. A. Larson, formerly connected with the Standard Oil Company,

in Mongolia, and now employed as Adviser to Mongolian Affairs to the Chinese Government, had not a great deal to add to the information he supplied on a previous occasion. He had been especially in the disturbed area, but had returned to Kalgan on the approach of the Mongols, who are stated to be on longer on friendly terms with him since his connection with the Chinese Government. The information from Mongol sources was obtained from Mr. T. A. Rustad, Representative of Kalgan of the British American Tobacco Company, who has been for some time in Urgan, has travelled extensively both in Eastern and Western Mongolia, and has a knowledge of the Mongolian language. Some reliable and very reliable, was also obtained from the Consul General of Foreign Affairs, but the Military Governor of Kalgan, General Ho Tsung Lien, who might have supplied reliable information, excused himself from receiving us on the plea of being ill.

The present situation is gathered from the above and appears to be as follows:-

The Chinese troops are widely scattered along the border under the direct command of the Military Governor of Jehu, Kalgan and Kwei-lin-cheng, and the Prefecture of Delant. The distribution of these troops in March was given in detail in a report (No: 4, dated 4th March 1913), on the Distribution of Chinese troops in Chih-li and the border of Mongolia. This distribution is understood to have been very little altered since then, and the troops in round numbers are approximately, or below, distributed in the districts shown on attached sketch map. This estimate is probably a low one:-

In the Jolot District and Manchurian border.	20,000
In the Kalgan District.	7,000
In the Delouan District.	5,000
In the Kwei-lan-ching District.	6,000

The large extent of country which these troops have to guard necessitates their being widely dispersed, and hence they are everywhere. The Mongols, consequently, being extremely mobile are able to concentrate rapidly and attack any particular point before the Chinese garrison can be reinforced.

There are two main classes of Mongol troops, the regular forces of the Hu-tu-tu, which have been, and still are being, trained by Russian instructors, and the so-called Han-tu-tu, composed of robbers and such like.

Recent reports from Ugei State that the regular troops already trained by the Russian instructors do not number more than 600, and that this force has been distributed at various points to form a nucleus for training a larger force.

It is not known how far, if at all, the regular troops of the Hu-tu-tu have been drafted to Inner Mongolia, and all reports point to the fact of the disturbances in that region being caused by robber bands and not by regular troops. The fact that foreigners have been reported to have been seen with the Mongols in this neighbourhood, even if true, does not necessarily mean that they were with regular troops, and taking into consideration the fact that negotiations have been under progress for the peaceable settlement of the Mongolian question it seems unlikely that the regular troops of the Hu-tu-tu have been engaged in operations against Chinese troops.

The other class of Mongol troops in the field are the so-called brigands from near the border of Manchuria. Some of these are

are stated by Mr. Larson to have been part of the force of the Mongol Chief Wutai, who was killed in the T'ung-tai district last August. Many of them are also stated to be the followers of Tokhtai Taiji, sometimes called EL SHI TAI, a well-known robber chief from the Manchurian border who has been in Urga for some time. They appear from Mr. Rustad's statement to be equipped with rifles, and to be well armed, and were the first to come through the Chinese border into the area of the disturbed area.

It was stated by Dr. Morrison in March last that 1600 Mongols had left Urga for Inner Mongolia, 1000 of which, followers of Tokhtai Taiji, originally came from Eastern Mongolia, and were, he stated, brigades. They are reported to have been followed by the Mongols of the Sunil tribe of Inner Mongolia. Reiterating that 4,000 Mongols belonging to the four great tribes of Outer Mongolia were also stated to be under orders to move from Urga toward Inner Mongolia. This latter statement was later confirmed by later information, and it is quite possible that there are not more than two or three thousand Mongols under arms along the frontier guarded by the Military Government of Kalgan and Kwei-shan-sheng. These Mongols are not supposed to be equipped with more than a few hundred rifles.

For the movement of the Mongol troops there is no doubt that large quantities of rifles and ammunition have been distributed. Mr. Rustad states that 5,000 old (B-1) Russian rifles were delivered at Urga, that 10,000 new (B-2) Russian rifles were supplied by the Russians, and that 10,000 Mausers were supplied by a German firm and sent to Urga via the Siberian Railway. He and Mr. Larson both state that

convoys of rifles and ammunition have been sent out in all directions from Urga, and that most of them were sent to Tibet.

Owing to the absence of reliable maps, and to the difficulty of identifying the names of places mentioned in Chinese reports, it is not easy to follow the movements of the Mongol bands, and their skirmishes with Chinese troops. But Chinese reports from Chinese sources they appear to have spread across the territory of the Silingol League of Inner Mongolia. A conflict was reported in April some distance North of Dargan in which the Chinese troops (Presumably Troops of China Province) appeared to have suffered defeat.

Another conflict is reported to have taken place in the middle of May about 20 miles South of the Pao-ching T'ung-shan office on the Kalgan-Urga road, in which the Chinese troops suffered a severe reverse. Though the Chinese authorities belittle this encounter, they admit that the General in Command, Major-General Li Kwei Yung, was wounded, and that a battle took place. The encounter is described by Mongols as a fight between 200 Mongols and 1,000 Chinese, in which the Chinese lost over 100 killed. There is no doubt that several houses were burned, and fourteen carts full of wounded were sent to Kalgan. Such details as are known of this incident throw some light on the state of the Chinese troops. Mr. Larin, who saw the battle before the encounter, reports that they were engaged in a battle with practically no military preparation. They were surprised by the Mongols, who surrounded them and fired into them from the high ground. The Chinese were then seen to have been much demoralized and to have fled in confusion, leaving

their stores and the machine guns in the hands of the Mongols.

Dr. Macdonald stated that it had been arranged by the Chinese that the leader of this band of Mongols was to surrender to the Chinese, after a show of resistance, but that finding the Chinese such a easy prey, he was unable to resist the temptation to attack them.

The troops who were defeated on this occasion were a mixed force of the 1st Division. They were Manchus, but were sent to Kalgan during the Revolution and stayed along the border. The Chinese authorities at Kalgan frankly stated that they thought these men were to be got out of the way. It seems to be expected that they will fight well and that is all that is expected. It is not therefore surprising that a Corps of the III Division has been sent to Kalgan to act as a buffer to these troops, and to allow the forces of the 1st Division, who were becoming nervous at the prospect of a further Mongol advance. The 9th Regiment of this Division, with detachments of Cavalry, Artillery, Transport and Engineers, had arrived at Kalgan by the 31st May, and the 10th Regiment is now on its way there. One train-load at least of troops of this Division had gone along the Kalgan-Shijiazhuang Railway, but the composition and destination of the troops has not yet been ascertained. Though the presence of these troops may serve to prevent a panic, they are not trusted by the people, as they belong to the 3rd Division that looted Peking. It has been necessary for the Military Governor to make a personal appeal to the soldiers to keep the people.

Other reinforcements for the disturbed areas are under way.

from Shanhai Province. Previous to the fight near Ping-tien a small party of Shanhai troops in that neighborhood was set up by the Mongols, and, according to Mr. Linton who was there at the time, there was no cooperation between the Shanhai troops and the 1st Division. The Shanhai reinforcements consist of a Mixed Brigade from Tai-jian Fu.

On the whole, the military situation in the Kulung district is probably not so serious as would appear from recent telegrams. The object of the Mongol band appears to be solely to attack isolated Chinese garrisons, to create disturbances and to harass the Inner Mongols, and to pillage when opportunities offer. It is unlikely that they intend to do more than this. Judging from recent events the Mongols might be able to drive in the thin cordon of Chinese troops, but the hilly country through which the Great Wall runs is not suited to mounted troops, and their advance would be checked by the Great Wall itself. Kulung may be considered safe against attack, as though it is really only a walled city, it is protected by hills. Kuai-lung-chang is much more vulnerable, as it is well beyond the Great Wall and further from support from Chinese troops. This district is garrisoned by troops of the 1st (Mantchou) Division, and by Provincial and Border troops of Shanhai Province whose fighting efficiency is not believed to be very great. Mongols have already been reported to be looting the boundary wall of Ping-tien-cheng, and it is probable that it is an object of the Tzu'u's plans for the safety of Kuai-lung-chang district that he has ordered a brigade from Tai-jian Fu to move to attack Kuai-lung-cheng.


The methods adopted by the Chinese against the Mongols are

not seem to be very suitable, though they may be the only ones possible under the circumstances. Decidedly reliable forces are expected by early morning and a further 10,000 men will be scattered sedentary infantry posts, and it is not known whether mobile columns of about 200 selected cavalry are available organized on the same basis as the Mongol bands in the latter part of their campaign.

It is true a large number of effectives have been sent to an independent cavalry brigade, but the new force has not been specially chosen from Chinese troops. Only the best men of this class can compete with Mongol horsemen, and it may be that the Chinese have no suitable troops in this region. It is possible, however, that the Chinese prefer to attack their enemies by indirect means, and that they intend to invade the Mongols in the field to come to terms possibly after a show of resistance are not willing to view of the present military situation in the Tibet-Mongolia. It is possible as if similar methods are being employed with the British territory of Hainan.

S S Robertson Major,
Military Attaché,
P.O. Box 100.

Copy to C of G S India
G.S. Robertson



Sketch map to show position of Chinese troops on Mongolian border

Put away with 125-10

Register No.

2516

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 70. 27-50

Dated 23 } June 1913. M
Rec. 23

Date. Initials. SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 24 June J.S.

Secretary of State..... 24 J.W.

Committee..... 25 E.

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia
Russo-Chinese Agreement regarding
Mongolia.

Copy sent direct to India

FOR INFORMATION.

Article 3. Russia agrees "with the
"exception of such officials as are allowed
"by Treaty for the Consulates not to place
"other kinds of officials as Russian
"representatives." But this will not
prevent Mongolia being flooded by Russian
civil + military officers, nominally
in the service of the Mongolian Govt.,
through whom a virtual Russian pro-
tectorate will be established.

Article 5 confirms the Russo-
Mongolian agreement.

Seen Pol Com. Sec.,
1 JUL 1913

Previous Papers:—

2226
ek

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 27450

address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

5

11. 22. 13

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India


_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

June 23, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H. M. Minister at Peking No. 228 June 2, 1913.	Russo. Chinese Agreement re Mongolia. 

(Similar letter sent to

)

(2)

27450

Peking.

June 2, 1913

No 228.

Copy to India & Tokio

Sir,

Draft Agreement

With reference to my telegram No 88 of April 9 last, I have the honour to forward to you herewith the draft of an Agreement between Russia and China which is now being considered by a secret Committee of the House of Representatives, with regard to the affairs of Outer Mongolia.

By the first Article of this draft Agreement, Russia recognises Mongolia to be an integral part of China and agrees to respect all the rights of China consequent on such territorial integrity. The second article concedes an important point of the demands of the Mongols, namely their right to oppose by force colonisation by others within their boundaries. Under Article 3 Russia will have to withdraw her troops at present stationed

Right Honourable,

in

Sir Edward Grey Bart .K.G. M.P.

&c. &c. &c.

in North Mongolia, with the exception of Consulate
Guards. By Article ⁴ China allows herself to be
guided by Russian advice and she grants by Article 5
all the privileges of the Urga Protocol.

This draft, which has reached me from an
indirect source, is the translation of a Chinese text
which in its turn is probably the rendering of a Russian
or French version of the Agreement.

The Russian Minister informs me that he
expects a satisfactory solution of the question within
the next few days.

I have the honour to be,

with the highest respect,

Sir,

your most obedient

humble servant,

(signed) J.N.Jordan

27450

U. S. S. R.

Russo-Chinese Agreement re Mongolia.

China and Russia with the object of obviating misapprehensions which might possibly arise from the present situation in Mongolia have agreed upon the following stipulations:-

1. Russia recognises Mongolia to be an integral part of the territory of China and hereby explicitly undertakes not to seek to interrupt the continuity of its territorial integrity; Russia further undertakes to respect China's rights of every description which heretofore have existed in consequence of this territorial integrity.

2. China undertakes not to change the system of local self-government which has hitherto existed in outer Mongolia, and since the Mongolians in Outer Mongolia are responsible for the defence of, and the maintenance of order within their boundaries, they are granted the sole right to organise troops and police. They are also granted the right to oppose colonisation by others than Mongols within their boundaries.

3. Russia on its part undertakes that with the exception of Consulate Guards it will not despatch troops to Outer Mongolia and also undertakes not to carry out colonisation measures in Outer Mongolia, and further that with the exception of such officials as are allowed by Treaty for the Consulates not to place
other

other kinds of officials as Russian representatives.

4. China desiring to employ its rights in Outer Mongolia in a peaceful manner hereby declares that it will accept such principles of procedure as Russia as mediator may lay down in accordance with the objects set forth in the foregoing stipulations for China's treatment of Outer Mongolia and that the Chief Official of the Central Government there shall regard himself as having the character hitherto attaching to the local official in any part of China.

5. The Government of China, out of consideration for the mediation of the Russian Government agrees to give to Russian subjects in Outer Mongolia the commercial privileges to be enumerated here below. (Here follows the 17 Articles of the Urga Protocol)

6. Hereafter in the case of agreements between Russia and Outer Mongolia relating to changes in the international relationships of that region it is necessary that China and Russia consult direct and only after the Chinese Government has given its consent shall they become effective.

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1235/13

1111

Minute Paper.

Register No.
2220
123

Secret Department.

Letter from *Co.*

Dated } 5 June, 1913.
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
		<i>LB</i>	<i>Me</i>
Under Secretary.....	6 June	<i>AW</i>	<u>Mongolia</u> Russian activity in Mongolia: representations by Japanese Govt
Secretary of State.....	7	<i>J.W.H</i>	
Committee.....	8	<u><i>E</i></u>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India - *See...*

FOR INFORMATION.

10 JUN 1913

Previous Papers:—

2098 etc
Comm
W.F.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 25042

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

2226

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H.

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*

*and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*


Foreign Office,

June 5, 1913.

Reference to previous letter :

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. - Ambassador at Tokio Telegram No. 5/ May 30, 1913.	Mongolia.



(Similar letter sent to

)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir C. Greene to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31, 12.45 A.M.)

*Tokyo, May 30, 11.40 P.M.
(May 30, 1913.)*

(No. 51.)

RUSSIAN activity in Mongolia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Japanese Government have represented at St. Petersburg that Russian suspicions as to intended aggression of Chinese are unfounded. He has held the same language to the Russian Ambassador here, who had mentioned the subject on two or three occasions.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs attributes uneasiness of Russians to certain over-active military commanders in regions concerned, who spread exaggerated reports about the designs of the Chinese, such, for instance, as the [group undecypherable] endeavour of the latter to cut the Trans-Siberian Railway.

(Sent to Peking.)

Put away with

1235/13

Register No.

Minute Paper.

2098

Secret Department.

Letter from 20.

Dated } 23 May 1913
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
		20	
Under Secretary.....	27 May	AB	<u>Mongolia</u> Russian policy in Mongolia : attitude of Japanese Govt.
Secretary of State.....	28	P. W. H.	
Committee.....	28	C.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen P. L. C. 2226


17 June 1913

Previous Papers :—

189

178

M-1781 241 26/5



THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[April 21.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[18239]

No. 1.

Sir C. Greene to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received April 21.)

(No. 80.)

Sir,

Tokyo, March 31, 1913.

IN the course of a general conversation which I had the other day with Baron Makino, I told his Excellency that I had read on my voyage to Japan an interesting article in an English review dealing with the situation in Outer Mongolia, and describing the activity of Russia in transforming the lamas into a military population. I had also, I said, noticed a number of articles in the Japanese press since my arrival here discussing the same question. I presumed that it presented some interest for the Japanese Government.

Baron Makino said that he was of course following the trend of events, but that he did not think the movement was likely to affect Japan. As long as Russian activity was confined to Outer Mongolia, Japan would look quietly on. He did not anticipate any encroachment upon Inner Mongolia, but relied upon Russia to abide by her engagements to Japan.

"You have, then, complete confidence in Russia," I asked. Baron Makino replied with a decided "Yes."

I have, &c.

CONYNNGHAM GREENE.

[2882 x-1]

Register No.

1889

Put away with 1235

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O.

Dated } 8 May 1913.
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	13 May	att	<u>Mongolia</u> Note on the Mongolian administrative system, &c. Russian policy in Mongolia.
Secretary of State.....	14	28	
Committee.....	16	C	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 9 May 1913,
Secy. no. 19

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers:—

1781

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[April 17.]

SECTION 3.

[17559]

No. 1.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 122.)

Peking, March 27, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a series of notes on the tribal and administrative system and other matters connected with Mongolia which have been prepared by Lieutenant Binsteed, of the Essex regiment, and have, I understand, been chiefly drawn from Russian sources. Lieutenant Binsteed has passed some time at Urga, and has acquired a knowledge of Mongolian affairs which is altogether remarkable.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian Situation.

Tribal and Administrative System.

THE Hoshun (Banner, principality) is the fief of any one ruling prince, called its djassak.

The aimak or tribe is an association of one or more hoshuns, the djassaks of which are descended from a common ancestor.

The above two institutions are of true Mongol origin.

The league (Meng, Ch'igulgan, Ch'ulgan) is a comparatively recent institution, invented by the Ta Ch'ings to replace or weaken the true Mongol tribal organisation. In Khalkha each of the existing four aimaks went to form a league. In other parts of Mongolia one or more aimaks were grouped together into leagues. The princes of the league meet periodically in a diet to discuss governmental matters. The president or captain-general of the league is elected by the djassaks and confirmed by the president (Emperor).

Mongolia is thus divided :—

1. Inner Mongolia (a popular term) :

(a.) The six leagues of Inner Mongols :—

(1.) *Cherim League.*—Khorch'in, Durbat, Jaliat, and Ghorlos (Horlos) aimaks, supervised by Fengtien tutu.

(2.) *Chouuda League.*—Aru Khorch'in Jarud, Onniu Bairin, Naimam, Aokhan, Keshektem, and Khalkha Left Wing aimaks.

(3.) *Chosot'u League.*—Khalach'in and Tumet aimaks.

The last two leagues are supervised by Jehol Tu T'ung (Military Governor).

(4.) *Silingol League.*—Uch'umuch'in, Much'it, Abaga, Abaganor, and Sunit aimaks, supervised by Ch'ahar, Military Governor.

(5.) *Ulan Ch'ap League.*—Durben Muhet, Mao Mingan or Ssu Tzu, Urat and Khalkha Right Wing aimaks.

(6.) *Ikh Chao League,* consisting of Ordos aimak.

The last two leagues supervised by Sui Yüan, Military Governor.


(b.) The Alashan Moshuts and Etsingol Old Torguts, supervised by Ning Hsia, Military Governor, and Kansu tutu.

(c.) The Ch'ahar Mongols who have been turned into bannermen of Manchu type and have no princes of their own, but are directly under the Ch'ahar Military Governor.

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2. Khalkha, consisting of:—

- (a.) The Tsetsen Khan aimak or league.
- (b.) The Tushetu Khan aimak or league.

The above were under the Urga Amban before the Hutukhta's *coup d'état*.

- (c.) The Sain Noin aimak or league.
- (d.) The Jasakt'u Khan aimak or league.

The above two were under the Uliasutai Military Governor. Na Yen T'u has never, however, ventured to go to his post.

Khalkha also contains 100,000 landless serfs of the Urga Hutukhta, known as Shabi, who nomadise chiefly near Urga on the lands of various hoshuns.

The eighty-six hoshuns of the Khalkha aimaks have no permanent designation, but are known by changeable popular names formed from the name and rank of the present ruling prince.

3. Kobdo district, containing a league of Durbets and Hoits and three odd hoshuns of Eleuths, Mingats, and Jahach'ins. In the Chinese system, under Kobdo Amban.

4. The Altai district, formed in 1907 out of the former large Kobdo district, and containing New Torguts, New Hoshuts, and some non-Mongol tribes. Under the Altai Amban, with headquarters at Sharasumé, alias Tulta or Ch'eng Hua Ssu.

5. The Tannu Urianghai tribes, probably of non-Mongol origin, with a complicated organisation, and formerly loosely under the control of Uliasutai and the two Western Khalkha aimaks and the Urga Hutukhta. This territory is probably Russian by right of the Burins Treaty of 1727, and has been always treated, even by the Chinese and Mongols, as being outside the line of Mongol frontier guard posts. There is every reason to believe that it will be handed over to Russia by the Urga Hutukhta.

Besides the above, the following Mongols live outside Mongolia (in the generally accepted sense):—

(a.) In Hsinchiang, the Old Torguts, some hoshuts and Ch'ahars, all in Tarbagatai or Ili districts, and under the Ili Military Governor.

(b.) The Kukunor Mongols (Hoshuts, Durbets, Torguts, Hoit, and Khalkhas), who form, with the Tanguts (Thibetans), the bulk of the population of the new Chinese province of Ch'inghai.

(c.) The Bargut Mongols (Buriats and Eleuths), who form, with some Tungus tribes, the natives of Baga (Kulumber Hailar district) in what was formerly Heilungchiang.

(d.) The Buriats of Transbaikalia and Irkutsk Government, in Russian territory.

Historical and Ethnographical Factors.

Lack of Unity among the Mongols.—All through their history the Mongol princes have been quarrelling amongst themselves. The inner Mongols entered the Manchu Empire in order to avoid the domination of the Khan of the Ch'ahars; the Khalkhas sought Manchu protection to save themselves from the Eleuths (Western Mongols or Jungars or Kalmucks as often rendered); Manchus and inner Mongols have fought the Khalkhas; Khalkhas and Manchus waged eighty years' desultory warfare with the Eleuths. All these hatreds and rivalries have been sedulously fostered by the Ta Ch'ings. The chief reason why the Urga Hutukhta was chosen ruler of independent Mongolia was that, as religious head of Mongolia, he was outside the rivalries of the princes, who could never agree to one of themselves assuming the Bogdo Khanate.

Friendship for Russia.—Though it is obvious even from Russian authorities that there are exceptions, still, speaking generally, the Mongols may be said to entertain friendly feelings for the Russians and their Great White Czar (Tsagan Khan), who is incidentally a Hubilgan or Living Buddha, and under whom the Buriats, who are Mongols, live more prosperously than their brethren under the Chinese Government.

Hatred of Chinese, as the clever usurers to whom every Mongol prince, every Hoshun, and every Mongol family are in debt (see later under "Trade").

Chinesification.—Wherever Chinese colonisation has had time to have its full effect, as in Chosut'u League, the Mongol loses his national characteristics, his own language, and becomes Chinesified. The Chinese colonisation has progressed very far also in Cherim and the southern part of Chou uda Leagues, and along the Great Wall

in Western Chihli and Shansi. In T'ao Nan Fu district, as the result of hardly twenty years' colonisation, there are 82,000 Chinese to 23,000 Mongols, and 4,000 of the latter have adopted agriculture, a prelude to complete Chinesification. In outer Mongolia the only colonised parts are the fertile valley bottoms between Urga and Kiakhta. Sando, the late Urga Amban, was very active in extending Chinese influence in his area, and in 1911 opened a colonisation bureau at Urga.

Russian Aims.

Basing conclusions on a study of recent Russian literature and the events of the last eighteen months, the aims of the Urga Hutukhta's Mongols and of Russia would seem to differ in some essentials, and to be roughly as follows:—

Russia wants a natural frontier for her Asiatic dominions resting on the Great Desert line which intersects Mongolia, and prolonged through Manchuria by the existing line between Russian and Japanese spheres of influence. Chuguchak Possiet Bay is usually suggested. But in view of Russia being already unable to cope with the task of developing Siberia, it is not desirable to annex new territory now, but only to prevent it falling into the hands of the Chinese; in other words, to earmark it as a Russian preserve to be used later on when means are forthcoming. To effect this China must not colonise and Chinesify Northern Mongolia, as Sando had actually begun to do, and China must not create an army in Northern Mongolia, as had been actually projected. Kiakhta is only three cavalry marches from the weakest point in Russia's long line of communications with the Far East, the defile by which the Siberian Railway slips round the south end of Baikal. Russia does not fear China now in the military sense, but she does fear for the future, and even now she fears dreadfully economic competition from the Chinese, who, if given equal opportunities, would economically enslave the Russian peasants. In this respect Russia's attitude to the Chinese is the same as her attitude towards the Jews.

Again, Russia wishes to revive her almost extinguished trade in Mongolia (see later under "Trade").

Russian writers never imagine that Russian influence can ever be made supreme south of the Gobi line, which is regarded as inevitably destined to be swallowed up by the Chinese.

The Hutukhta of Urga's ambitions seem, however, to extend to all Mongolia not actually irretrievably colonised by Chinese. Even that stronghold of the Chinese, T'ao Nan Fu, was to be annexed. The passivity of the Russians during the T'ao Nan Fu troubles shows clearly the divergence of aims between them and the Urga Government. Russians have no trade interests in existence in Mongolia east of the Kingan mountains. Again, when Barga effected its independence, Russia refused to accept their proffered entrance into the Russian Empire, and the alliance of Barga with Khalkha was made without even the knowledge of the Russian Government (Colonel Baranof's recent semi-official pamphlet on Barga). Besides Cherim, the Urga Hutukhta has at different times within the last year attempted to gain over Silinghol League and parts of Ulan Ch'ap League and Kobo. In the latter district he has apparently been at least partially successful. The Chinese have, however, in the Altai ruler, Prince Palta, a rabid Russophobe, Japonophile, friend of Prince Kalach'in, himself a Turgut, who, being a clever educated man, will probably make the fullest use of the historical enmity between the Khalkhas and the Western Mongols to prevent the adherence of the latter to the Urga Government. This part of the Mongolian question is, however, complicated by the fact that Western Mongolia is that most remote from China, and has several comparatively good communications with Russian territory. Moreover, there have been several indications in the press that the Governor-General of Ili, who controls many Mongol banners, has been somewhat under Russian influence, and has not quite the same views as the Republican Government. He is a Manchu.

The policy of the Chinese Government, exclusive of any military operations it may undertake, is to win over or to keep the adherence of as many princes as possible by the bestowal of monetary rewards and titles. An official of the Bureau of Mongolian and Thibetan affairs told me a few days ago that the President is anxious to avoid making any administrative, titular or other changes with regard to Mongolia for fear of offending Mongol conservatism and arousing amongst the princes fears as to the future security of their own positions.

Finally, we must note the persistent reports of internal trouble amongst the Hutukhta's adherents. These have generally concerned discontent among the new

troops owing to default of pay and dissensions between the Hutukhta and his commander-in-chief, Tao Shih-tao.

Adherents of the Republic.

According to a list of princes who adhere to the republic, recently shown me by Dr. Morrison, the former comprise the following:—

All the six leagues of Inner Mongols.
All the Kukunor Mongols.
The Ili Old Turguts.
The Durbets of Kobdo.
The Altai New Hoshuts and New Turguts.
The Alashan and Eysingol Mongols.
Some Urianghai tribes.

This probably means that the Urga Government already have the adherence of—

All Khalkha.
Parts of Kobdo; and all the Tannu-Urianghai tribes.

Trade.

(Based chiefly on the reports of the two 1910 expeditions to Mongolia: (a) of Tomsk professors; (b) of Moscow merchants and other recent Russian literature).

Russian trade during the last few years before 1910 (the last year of which there is any extensive literature) may on the whole be said to have been markedly getting worse. In a word Russian exports into Mongolia have decreased, but imports from Mongolia into Siberia have increased. The figures given are only approximate, there being no complete custom-house organisation to furnish full figures. From 4,571,175 roubles (roughly 450,000*l.*) in 1906 Russian exports into Mongolia dwindled in 1909 to 2,621,029 roubles (262,000*l.*). But the diminution is very unequally distributed between the points on the frontier. The exports of Kiakhta actually fell from 1,592,000 roubles in 1906 to 189,000 roubles in 1909, i.e., to about one-tenth in four years. It is only the exports in the extreme western custom-houses that have maintained their figures without great diminution. In 1906 dressed skins were exported through Kiakhta to the value of 3,000*l.* In 1909 only 28*l.* worth were passed. On the other hand imports from Mongolia into Russia, after a steady increase up to 560,000*l.* in 1908, in 1909 suddenly rose to 800,000*l.* But one fact detracts from the value of this rise. With every year the Russian merchants are becoming less able to buy direct from the Mongols, who sell cheap, and are being forced to buy from the Chinese who take everything the Mongol has to part with in payment of debts. The Chinese resell to the Russians dear, and are slowly getting even the Russian traders to borrow money from them (the Chinese) and to buy Chinese imported manufactured goods for resale to the Mongols, instead of importing Russian goods. Thus, but for the Urga convention, Russian goods were destined to be soon wholly excluded from Mongolia.

Dispersion of Trade.—Trade in Mongolia is on a wholly peculiar basis. The first factor to note is the absence of any great trading centres and the extreme dispersion of trade. Kalgan, Kuei Hua Ch'eng, Urga, Uliasutai, and Kobdo are only great warehouses where the big Chinese firms temporarily store their stocks until they are slowly distributed to agents, who hawk the goods amongst the pasturages, or sell them in the small shops to be found in the vicinity of every lamasery and every prince's encampment. Chinese trade is predominant everywhere in Mongolia. Russian trade is nowhere predominant and only exists at all in about half Mongolia, namely the north-west and Urga rayons. Russian trade enters by the following frontier points: *Bakhta (opposite Chuguchak), *Zaisansk, *Kosh Agach (Kobdo-Biisk Road), Usinskoye (Minusinsk-Urianghai Road), the Tunka Road (north end of Lake Kosogol) and *Kiakhta. Those marked with an asterisk have custom-houses.

Unavoidability of Long Credit.—The failure of Russian trade is due, among other obvious causes, to the unavoidability of all trade being based on long credit in Mongolia. There is no money; Chinese and Russian notes and weighed silver are only used in limited quantities and nearly all transactions are by exchange of commodities. The Mongol, whereas he is in constant need of commodities, at all times of the year, can only repay when wool, fur, cattle and his other products of live stock are in a

saleable condition which for various climatic and other reasons only occurs at definite limited periods. Those who sell them to him must, therefore, be able to wait for repayment. In this respect the Chinese are far better circumstanced than the Russians. They have banks, the Russians have none. Their guilds afford them mutual co-operation. The Russian merchants, on the other hand, are universally charged with a suicidal policy of mutual competition, the exaction of exorbitant prices by the wholesale firms from the retailers and of exorbitant rates of interest.

Again, the representatives of the Chinese Government assist the Chinese merchants to collect their debts and on the other hand have refused to even hear any more complaints by Russians on this account. The Mongols have also been forbidden to borrow from Russians. The comparative number of Chinese officials as compared with Russian consuls is also an advantage for the Chinese. Moreover, the Russian merchants complain of the attitude of the Russian consuls and of their being chained to their consulates in Urga, Uliasutai, and Sharasumé in the vicinity of which only a small portion of the trade goes on.

Moreover, the Russian trade in Mongolian cattle and skins is now very much hampered by the excessively strict and badly arranged (according to Russian non-official critics) quarantine and disinfecting arrangements on the frontier.

The Chinese on the other hand labour under the disadvantage of, in many cases, a longer distance from the nearest railway. The goods the Chinese sell are largely British, American, Japanese, and German manufactured goods, and in this way the forcible strangling of Chinese trade by Russo-Mongolian restrictions will, to some extent, affect European interests. It is impossible to get any even rough figures of the quantity of goods imported by the Chinese into Mongolia.

Lastly, the inferior business qualities of the lower class Russian and the perennial mutual recriminations between official and non-official Russian elements have further helped Chinese commercial success.

Some Notes on the Aimaks and Hoshuns of the four Eastern Leagues of Inner Mongols, with special reference to Progress of Chinese Colonisation and Economic Wealth.

Chosot'u League (Khalachin and T'umet Aimaks).

Population mixed, Chinese predominating.

Those Mongols that remain have become Chinesified, dislike and are disliked by other Mongols. Chinese colonisation has been going on for 200 years, but on a small scale, till 1891. At first the Mongols, pleased at being able to get rent for land, but later unfriendliness arose, and Mongols mostly retired into the hills. In 1891, massacres of Mongols by the Chin Tan Tao society, partly owing to racial ill-feeling and partly to refusal of Mongols to let more land.

1892: Disorder suppressed. Part of surviving Mongols migrated, chiefly into Ch'erim League.

Chou Uda League.

Aokhan.—Thickly colonised by Chinese. Mongols have turned to agriculture, and lost much of their racial distinctions.

Naiman.—Half occupied by Chinese. Some Mongols adopted agriculture.

Bairin.—No Chinese colonists. A few Mongol agriculturists.

Jarud.—

Tzun or East Jarud Hoshun: Thickly colonised by Chinese. Mongols, few and poor, have settled in fixed yurts surrounded by gardens; keep pigs and poultry. Horses and cattle few, no sheep, but goats. In general, Mongols in Khingan Mountains have few sheep, as they are unable to stand the dampness of the valleys. On Nain gol a Chinese town was founded with "workmen battalions."

Barun or West Jarud: Mongol population poor and scarce. South of hoshun colonised by Chinese. Mongols live part in yurts, part in Chinese houses. Sheep and cattle few, some agriculture.

Aru Horchin.—Comparatively thick Mongol population. No Chinese. Conditions for agriculture, good. Some agriculture exists, but is poorly carried out. Cattle and

horses abound. No sheep, but goats. Mongols in general live in yurts, but in eastern part are settled in houses with gardens and fields.

Ominiut.—Both hoshuns completely colonised by Chinese; Mongols are Chinesified, some even having forgotten their own language.

Keshekten.—Contains Dolonor, a religious centre artificially created by the Manchus. One-fifth of the land belongs to the fifteen Hutukhtas of Dolon Nor. Dalai Nor Lake is on the boundary of this aimak, with Abagauor. Chinese catch much fish in this lake. Poultry farming in south-east part of hoshun.

Khalkha Left Wing, or Tsokhor Khalkha, meaning "Variegated" Khalkha.—Formed of the descendants of Khalkhas, who, in 1664, deserted Jasaktu Khan, migrated to Eastern Mongolia, and accepted Manchu sovereignty. Wholly colonised by Chinese.

Ch'erim League.

[N.B.—Below, the word "expropriate" will be used in short for the action of the Colonisation Bureau of proclaiming areas as open for colonisation and available for purchase.]

Horchin Aimak.—

Bo wang hoshun: Area, 140,625 fang. Four-fifths colonised. The Mongols in the east part have not retired before the Chinese, but are merged with them, quite Chinesified, and have forgotten Mongol language. Remaining one-fifth sandy and unsuitable for agriculture; nevertheless, it is proposed to colonise even this. On these lands there are 13,000 Mongols, who have 63,000 horses, 80,000 cattle, 132,000 sheep, and over 100,000 mules.

Bin-t'u-wang hoshun: Area, 22,750 square li, all open for colonisation; southern part quite colonised, and Mongols there Chinesified. North part unsuitable for agriculture, and here live 5,500 Mongols, who have 5,000 horses, 7,500 cattle, and 155,000 sheep.

Darkhan-wang hoshun: Largest in Ch'erim League. Contains six princes, besides the djassak. Princes closely related to the Imperial Family. Mongols, 35,000, live in mud yurts, chiefly cattle rearers, own 1,500,000 various cattle. Colonisation unassisted by Government progresses but slowly from south-east towards north-east. Salt is imported from Tzun Uchumuchin.

Tushe-kung hoshun: Area, 70,000 square li, expropriated 1,500,000 shang (a shang is a strip of land 5.2 feet broad and 1,410 feet long). Soil suitable for agriculture, but not so good as Jasaktu-wang hoshun. River Tor divides hoshun into a northern and southern part; north is hilly, south is steppe, and is all expropriated; 20,000 Chinese colonists and 4,000 Khalachins (see under Chasot'u League), who are agriculturists. Chinese also fish, obtain salt, and keep cattle; 6,000 horses, 3,000 cattle, and 2,000 sheep. Chinese and Khalachins breed good horses crossed with Russian horses, and good sheep. New-comers also comprise emigrants from Tumet and Darkhan-wang hoshun.

Mongols, 7,000, have 5,000 horses, 20,000 cattle, and 32,000 sheep.

Along the T'a-onan-fu-Tsitsikar road villages at least every 5 miles.

See also under T'ao-nan-fu.

Jasakt'u-wang hoshun: Contains the town of T'ao-nan-fu, and is the hoshun of Prince Wu-t'ai, who has been superseded as djassak by his uncle, so far as the Chinese Government is concerned.

Area, 90,500 square li, expropriated 2,430,000 shang. On colonised lands are 67,000 people, mostly Chinese, but also many Khalachins. On non-colonised lands are 4,000 Mongols (males exclusive of their females). Mongols are left only worst lands, so that if they wish to start agriculture they have to buy expropriated lands.

Mongols have 2,000 horses, 3,500 cattle, and 20,000 sheep.

See also under T'ao-nan-fu.

T'ushet'u-wang hoshun: Area, 97,785 square li; excellent pastures expropriated, 766,000 shang, sold 137,000 shang, chiefly in south part. Colonisation proceeds slowly.

Mongols, 5,000, some taken to agriculture; own 5,000 horses, 10,000 cattle, and 30,000 sheep, in north-east. Mongols still use yurts.

See also T'ao-nan-fu below.

Tao-nan-fu district: Administratively under Feng Tien province. It is formed out of the parts of the hoshuns of Tushet'u Wang, Jasakt'u Wang, and Tushé Kung, all of which are in Horchin Aimak.

The Fu was formed in 1893. There were expropriated for colonisation to form the fu the following areas :—

In Tushet'u Wang hoshun	Shang.	766,000
" Tushé Wang "	1,500,000
" Jasakt'u Wang "	2,430,000
Total in T'ao-nan-fu expropriated	4,696,000
Actually ploughed	67,800

Population : Chinese, 82,000—66,000 (various authorities); Mongol nomads, 19,000; Mongol agriculturists, 4,000. T'ao-nan-fu town has a population of from 12,000 to 7,000.

Chinese colonisation here began about 1890 in Jasakt'u Wang hoshun.

There are six hsien in the fu :—

1. K'ai Tung Hsien, in Jasakt'u Wang, 42 miles due south of T'ao-nan-fu.
2. An Kuang Hsien, in Tushé Kung, 57 miles south-east of T'ao-nan-fu.
3. Ching Tung Hsien, in Tushé Kung, 46 miles north-east of T'ao-nan-fu.
4. Ching An Hsien, in Tushetu Wang, 24 miles north of T'ao-nan-fu.
5. Ch'ien An Hsien, in Tushetu Wang, 34 miles north-west of T'ao-nan-fu.
6. Li Ch'üan Hsien, in Jasakt'u Wang, 54 miles west of T'ao-nan-fu.

Jalait Aimak.—Area, 185,000 square li. This and the aimaks of Khorlos and Durbet below are administratively connected with Hei-lung-chiang province, and chief Colonisation Bureau in operation here, lies at Tsitsikar.

The north-west parts of the hoshun are hilly and wooded.

The south has been expropriated and contains 40,000 colonists, of whom one-third are Khalachins and other Mongol immigrants. Good soil here. Owing to the existence of railway, navigable rivers, and many roads, a great economic future is to be expected for this hoshun, but so far colonisation has been slow, owing to—

1. Mongols hatred of Chinese.
2. The predatory operations of the bandit Toktohu.

Contains the Chinese town of Ta-tzu-ch'eng, founded in 1906, close to the River Chol, and 46 miles west of T'ao-nan-fu-Tsitsikar road (wrongly marked on Russian maps).

The nomad Mongols number 20,000, own 7,000 horses, 50,000 sheep, and 10,000 cattle.

(N.B.—With a view to possible military operations it is interesting to note that all the passes across the Khingan Mountains from Jalait into Tzun, Uch'umuch'in, and the Solon country are fortified and held by Chinese troops with machine guns. (Date of authority, October 1911.) This measure was initiated against Toktohu.)

Expropriated land	Shang.	720,000
Ploughed land	120,000

Ta-lai-t'ing has also been formed in this hoshun.

Durbet Aimak.—Area 50,000 square li. All land expropriated, except some 10,000 shang of saline soil. Chinese 20,000. Contains An-ta-t'ing. Fishing, agriculture, and salt-boiling carried on. Five stations of the Chinese Eastern Railway are within its borders, as also lies the Tsitsikar-Boduné track. A great future for colonisation to be expected. Mongols variously given at 30,000, or 628 families, with 10,000 shang of saline land, on which they have to keep 4,000 horses and mules, 5,000 cattle, and 22,000 sheep, which are too many for the land. Mongols must therefore work for Chinese or emigrate westwards to other hoshuns.

Khorlos (Ghorlos) Aimak.—West or rear or Barun Khorlos hoshun lies on the south bank of Sungari and Nonni; area 182,500 square li. One of the richest and most populous hoshuns in Ch'erim League. Chinese colonisation began 200 years ago, and the boundaries of the hoshun are now quite forgotten. Colonisation took place by mutual contract for hire of land. Mongols now have left 50,000 fang of poor soil, which is, however, still being taken up by Chinese. Soon the whole hoshun will be colonised.

Mongols, 20,000, Chinesified, live together with Chinese, and have 200,000 head of cattle. Agriculture is well carried out and breed of cattle good; 5,000 Mongols of the 20,000 are agriculturists.

Front or Tzun or East Khorlos : area 52,000 square *li*, between Chinese Eastern Railway, Sungari, and Nonni rivers. Expropriated (1911) 400,000 shang, but best lands have been bought back by Mongols. This hoshun reaches to Harbin. It is quickly being colonised by Chinese.

Exist haymaking, agriculture, cattle-rearing, fishing, obtaining salt. Mongols, 6,000 in number; own 3,000 horses, 6,000 cattle, and 9,000 sheep. Chinese number 55,000 (1910). Contains Chao Chou-t'ing.

The following figures are given by M. Bloban for 1910 for the area comprising Taonan-fu district, Khorlos Aimak, Durbet Aimak, and Jalait Aimak :—

Expropriated	Shang.
Ploughed	6,116,000
							362,800
Chinese population	191,000
Mongol	68,000

On the 302,000 shang ploughed are 200,000 agriculturists, *i.e.*, each person is supported by one and one-eighth shang. Consequently the expropriated lands could maintain over 4,000,000 persons.

Silingol League.

The only league of the four Eastern Inner Mongol leagues as yet practically untouched by Chinese colonisation (1911).

Uch'umuch'in Aimak.—Ikhe or Great or Barun or West Uch'umuch'in hoshun : exclusively occupied in horse and cattle breeding. No agriculture, but in south-east hay is harvested and stored for winter. Horses chiefly whites. Hoshun famous for its amblers. Salt is obtained from the lakes in large quantities and exported. Chief salt lake is Dabasu Nor, part of the lake belonging also to Tzun Huchit hoshun.

Baga or Little or Tzun or East Uch'umuch'in hoshun : chief occupation cattle-rearing, but there is also mushroom gathering and hunting for skins. No agriculture or haymaking. Conditions for agriculture are favourable.

Huch'it Aimak.—Tzun or East Huch'it hoshun : camel and cattle rearing. Hay harvested and stored for winter.

Barun or West Huch'it.

Abaga Aimak (two hoshuns : (1) Tzun ; (2) Barun).—This Aimak was formerly one with Abaganor and formed part of Khalkha. They thence migrated into Inner Mongolia, but again migrated into Khalkha to avoid Likdan Khan of the Ch'ahars. When the latter was defeated by the Manchus, Abaga returned to Inner Mongolia and accepted Manchu sovereignty.

Land suitable for agriculture, but none is carried out. The hoshun takes part in transporting salt from Uch'umuch'in to Dolon Nor.

Tzun Abaga's lands are the same as those of Tzun Abaganor.

Abaganor Aimak (two hoshuns).—Tzun Abaganor's lands are the same as those of Tzun Abaga.

Barun Abaganor's lands lie north of Dalai Nor, and include part of this lake and Ganga Nor with Gangur Ho River.

Land suitable for agriculture, but none carried out. Transporting salt forms a principal occupation.

Sunit Aimak (two hoshuns : Barun or West and Tzun or East).—Cattle and camel rearing. Hay stored for winter. No agriculture.

Soil in north shingly, in south sandy, not fertile. Several salt lakes. The largest lake in Barun or West Sunit is Yeren Dabasu Nor, where obtaining salt is free to Mongols of any hoshun in Mongolia, but Chinese have to pay 6 fen per ton. Elsewhere in Mongolia salt is the property of the Mongols of the hoshun in which lies the lake in question.

Influence of History on present Events.

Silingol League.—With reference to the present invasion of Silingol League by the Khalkhas, it is important to note that the Aimaks of the league have formerly in history often wavered between joining with the Inner Mongols or the Khalkhas.

and that Sunit Aimak actually, after submitting to the Manchus, deserted them and passed over to Khalkhas. Their re-entrance into the Manchu Empire was secured by force of arms in 1648.

The league being uncolonised, and having this historical friendly feeling for the Khalkhas, it is more than probable that, if allowed to have their way, they would prefer to form part of the dominion of Urga and not that of Peking.

G. C. BINSTEED, *Lieutenant,*
The Essex Regiment.

Peking, March 20, 1913.

Notes on Barga.

(Authority: Colonel Baranof's works on Mongolia.)

Barga is the popular local name for the part of Heilungchiang province which lies west of the Khingan range. To the Chinese it is known as Kolunber, derived from the names of the two lakes Kulun, or Dalai Nor, and Buir Nor. Its inhabitants are collectively known as Barguts, and consist of Buriats and Eleuths, who are Mongols, and of Solons and Chepchins, who are Tungus tribes.

The tribal organisation is as follows:—

Barga is divided into Shun or New Barga, containing eight hoshuns, and Huchin or Old Barga, containing nine hoshuns.

The eight hoshuns of Shun Barga are all of Buriats, who, about 1735, migrated hither from out of the Tsetsen Khan Aimak of Khalkha.

Huchin Barga contains six hoshuns of Solons, two hoshuns of Chepchins, and one hoshun of Eleuths.

The Solons and Chepchins were transported hither in 1732 from the Tsitsikar and Butkha districts of Heilungchiang province for being troublesome.

The Eleuths are descended from some of the soldiers of Galdan Tseren, Khan of the Eleuths or Jungars, who were captured by the Manchus in 1732, and settled here.

All the hoshuns have three somons except the Eleuth hoshun, which has only two. This latter hoshun stands in many ways apart from the organisation of the remainder.

Shun Barga is divided into two wings, called Daskul and Tsebul.

The eight Tungus hoshuns of Huchin Barga are similarly divided, four Solon hoshuns forming the Daskul wing and two Solon and two Chepchin hoshuns the Tsebul wing.

Each of the four wings is under a ugurda.

Each pair of hoshuns is under a golda.

The hoshuns have no separate rulers.

Each somon is under a tzangin.

Under the Manchus the hoshuns were formed into the usual banner troops organisation. Thus the eight hoshuns of Shun Barga and the eight hoshuns of Huchin Barga each formed a complete set of four plain and four bordered coloured banners. The old Eleuth banner was bordered yellow.

The whole of the above tribes are nomadic.

Religion.

In Barga the Mongols are lamaists and the Tungus tribes are shamanists.

The Secession of Barga and its Relation to History.

In January 1912 the Barguts effected their independence by force of arms, and later on entered the dominion of the Urga Hutukhta. The cause of the above was the belief of the Barguts that the recent policy of the Chinese Government would lead to the extinction of Bargut autonomy and national existence.

The claims of the Barguts to autonomy are based on the edict of the Emperor Yung Cheng, in which are set forth the conditions of the recognition by the Barguts

of Manchu sovereignty. In the event of Yung Cheng's refusal to accept these conditions, the Barguts would have placed themselves under Russian protection.

The chief events in the aggressive Chinese policy were as follows :—

1906 : The Barguts at the frontier guard posts were replaced by Chinese soldiers, who were intended to form the nucleus of further Chinese colonisation along the frontier. They prevented Russian subjects from freely crossing the frontier, as they had been in the habit of doing, for cutting hay, wood, and for grazing. This offended the nomadic idea of the free use of land.

1906 : The Chinese place a tax on the purchase by Russians from Barguts of cattle, fish, salt, hay, and timber. Some Russians claim free trade in Barga as in the rest of Mongolia.

1908 : Chinese Customs began to operate at Manchuria station. No protest made by Russia.

1906 : A commencement made in the colonisation of Barga with Chinese by the setting apart of lands for this purpose. As a whole the plan was not very successful, owing to Bargut opposition.

The post of Fu-tu-t'ung, or Assistant Military Governor of Hailar, was replaced by that of the Hailar Taotai. The old hoshun organisation was not officially done away with, but the hoshun authorities became inferior executive organs only, and Barga was divided into—

1. Lu-pin-fu.
2. Hailar, or K'u-lun-chih-li-t'ing, with seat of Taotai.
3. Chi-la-lin, or Shih-wei-chih-li-t'ing.

In 1906, 150 Chinese troops were brought in and stationed to protect Chi-la-lin gold-fields near the Argun River. Later on other troops were also stationed at Lu-pin-fu, near Manchuria station, and at Hailar.

Till 1906 there was only one school in Barga, namely, at Hailar, teaching Manchu and Mongol. In 1906 it was proposed to the Bargut authorities that schools for the Chinese language should be established. They protested that their nomad life made attendance impossible. Consequently at that time only one such school was opened at Hailar.

But in 1911 the Hailar Chinese school was raised in grade, and eight elementary schools were to be opened in other parts.

This appears to have aroused the Barguts to a sense of the nearness of the danger of Chinesification. They decided to act.

In September 1911 a Congress of Bargut leaders made the following demands of the Chinese authorities :—

- (a.) Removal of Chinese officials and transference of whole administration to hands of Barguts.
- (b.) Removal of Chinese troops.
- (c.) Cessation of Chinese colonisation.
- (d.) Subordination of Chinese in Barga to Bargut officials, or expulsion of those who would not agree to this.
- (e.) Taxes and customs dues to be at the disposal of Bargut administration.

The Chinese authorities refused these demands, and the Barguts took advantage of the Chinese revolution to revolt.

The Barguts, in January 1912, take Hailar, Lu-pin-fu, and later Chi-la-lin. The Chinese officials flee from Barga.

Having seceded from China, the Barguts at first wished to form an independent State under Russian protection. The Russian authorities persuaded them from this, and advised them to negotiate with the Chinese for a *modus vivendi*. The negotiations came to nothing. The Barguts then secretly appealed to the Urga Hutukhta to take them under his rule, and he agreed. On the 4th May, 1912, Ugurda Shen was installed ruler of Barga as the Hutukhta's nominee.

The above arrangement was concluded without even the knowledge of Russia. In the eyes of Colonel Baranof, at least, such a course is irregular, owing to the following facts :—

It is a moot point of history whether in 1676 the territory of present Barga did not belong to Russia.

In 1688 Khalkha entered the Manchu Empire. In 1689 Russia agreed that Barga should be part of the Manchu Empire, on the ground that it was originally part of the Tsetsen Khan Aimak, of Khalkha.

But the Chinese, having obtained Barga on this pretext, did not join it to Khalkha, but to Heilungchiang province of Manchuria.

Now that Barga has seceded from China, it is doubtful whether Russia has not a prior claim to it than Khalkha.

The Barguts, though opposed to Chinese immigration on the same grounds as the Russians and Khalkhas, are not opposed to Russian immigration, and have restored to Russian subjects all the old customary privileges which they enjoyed before the Chinese aggressive policy began.

G. C. BINSTEED, *Lieutenant,*
The Essex Regiment.

Peking, March 17, 1913.

Minute Paper.

Register No.

1781

Put away with

1235

73

Secret Department.

Letter from J. O. 18771

Dated } 5 May, 1913.
Rec. }

Date.

Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary.....

6 May

AA

Secretary of State.....

7

J. W. H.

Committee.....

8

E


Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia

Russian activity at Urga.

Copy to India



FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol Com. 28 MAY 1913

Previous Papers:—

1682

N. 1482


(1)

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 18771

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.



*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*

*_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,

May 5, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H.M. Minister at Peking No. 148 April 10, 1913.</i>	<i>Russian Activities in Mongolia</i>

(Similar letter sent to

)

18771

Peking.

April 10, 1913

148.

Sir:-

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the accompanying copy of a despatch regarding Russian activities in Mongolia which I have received from the Acting British Consul at Harbin.

in No. 17
12.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

(signed) J.N. Jordan.

Right Honourable

Mr Edward Grey, Bart., K.C., M.P.,

&c., &c., &c.,

Enclosure in Sir J. Jordan's No. 148 of April 10, 1913.

Acting Consul Estates to Sir John Jordan.

18771

(3)

H. B. M. Consulate,

HARBIN,

APR 24 913

April 2nd, 1913.

copy.

No. 17.

Confidential.

Sir:-

The following information has just reached me, through a trustworthy channel, from Mr. H. G. C. Perry-Ayscough, of the Chinese Postal Service, who has recently paid a visit to Mr. Vorostovetz at Urga. Mr. Perry-Ayscough does not state whether he has sent similar information to the Legation, so I venture to forward it at the risk of reduplication.

A force of about four hundred Russian troops is maintained at Urga, and Russian troops have also been despatched to Uliassutai and Kobdo, where trouble is expected.

Sir John N. Jordan, G.C.I.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,

&c., &c., &c.,

His Majesty's Minister,

P E K I N G .

expected. Monsieur Loubat, of the Russian Consular Service, has recently been sent on a mission of enquiry to the latter places.

A Russian Chief Instructor and ten subordinates are drilling the Mongols at Orga. Six hundred men have been turned out already, and about two hundred are now undergoing a course of drill. The men made a very poor impression on Mr. Perry-Ayscough, who saw them on parade. The Russians have inaugurated a school for Mongol boys, a Hospital, a Telephone system and a monthly newspaper, printed in the Mongol language. The telegraph line was taken over by the Mongols after the signature of the Agreement with Russia.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble Servant,

(Signed) A. E. EASTES,

Acting Consul.

Register No.

1682

Put away with

1235

13

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

● 2 Letter from 20.

Dated } 24 April, 1913.
Rec. }

Date. Initials. SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 29 Apr AM
Secretary of State..... 29 Sir. H.
Committee..... 29 C.
Under Secretary.....
Secretary of State.....

Mongolia
The Mongolian mission at St Petersburg.
Views of German Govt on Mongolian question.

Copy to India 25 April, Secy. 14.

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol Comm.,
26 MAY 1913
with 1781

Previous Papers:—

1592 etc

H 1592
H

1002
1913

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[April 7.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[15813]

No. 1.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 131.)

Sir,

Berlin, April 4, 1913.

IN the course of the proceedings in the budget committee of the Reichstag on the estimates for the Imperial Foreign Office to-day, the Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign Office is reported to have stated, in reply to certain questions in regard to China, that the treaty recently concluded with the Hutuktu of Urga conferred upon Russia a preferential position in the whole of Mongolia. As was well known, China had granted to the Russians as long ago as 1881 a number of rights in Mongolia, such as exemption from duties and consulates at ten places. Germany could, under her treaty with China of 1861, have claimed the same rights in Mongolia on the most-favoured-nation principle. This had hitherto not been done because German interests hardly existed there. Latterly German merchants at Harbin and Tien-tsin had begun to carry on trade with Mongolia. The country was comparatively poor, but it was to Germany's interest to keep it open to the trade of all nations, and it was to be hoped that the negotiations between Russia and China would lead to this result.

As regards the recognition of the Chinese Republic, Herr Zimmermann said that a new situation had been created by the decision of the American President the day after the Presidential election. Hitherto the Powers had intended to act together in this connection. Nothing was yet known as to the attitude which the other Powers proposed to adopt in view of the action of the Americans.

Turning to the question of the loan negotiations, the Under-Secretary of State went on to say that, in spite of the withdrawal of America from the six-Power group, the German Government was still anxious for the conclusion of the loan in the best interest of China, which in the absence of such a loan might fall too easy a prey to concession hunters, and instead of consolidating herself by means of serious reforms, fail to emerge from her present financial difficulties.

The Government, he said, proposed to do their utmost to extend the German schools in China. An additional 30,000 marks (15,000*l.*) would be asked for this purpose this year. It was proposed to attach an educational adviser to the legation at Peking. The obligatory introduction of the German language in Chinese schools would be urged. German was already prescribed for certain studies, such as pharmaceuticals, medicine, and forestry.

The consular system would, he said, be extended by the creation of a post at Chang-sha (Hunan), and it was also proposed to establish a consulate at Yünnan-fu.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[2883 g—1]

24 APR 1913

SE

1682

TIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[March 17.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[12285]

No. 1.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received March 17.)

(No. 84.)

St. Petersburg, March 13, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that it is reported in the Russian press that the Mongolian Mission is shortly leaving St. Petersburg for Urga via Moscow.

The "Novoe Vremya" states that the mission has entered into an agreement with M. F. K. Shiffler, representing the Russian and Foreign Ammunition Works, for an order of ammunition for the Mongolian army, and has granted him permission to open a store for ammunition, tents, and war material at Urga. The "Novoe Vremya" adds that the head of the mission recently visited the Lianosoff Oil Company, and encouraged them to start business in Mongolia.

The members of the mission last week again requested me to receive them, but in accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 96 of the 4th ultimo, I declined to do so.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2849 r-3]

24 APR 1913

17

Minute Paper.

Register No.

1592

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1225

Secret Department.

Letter from

Dated } 17 April 1913
Rec. }

Date. Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 22 Apr. A.A.

Secretary of State..... 23 J.W.H.

Committee..... 25 E.

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia

The present situation: Mongolian
military activity & Chinese intentions.

Copy to India 18 April 1913

FOR INFORMATION.

Yes, very good reading
25. IV 13

These reports are very
interesting. J.W.H.

RECEIVED POL COMB BR.,
28 MAY 1913
with 1787

Previous Papers:—

1396

[A]

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

1592

[March 29.]

1913

SECTION 3.

[14266]

No. 1.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.---(Received March 29.)

(No. 114. Confidential.)

Sir,

Peking, March 14, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 108 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that I have received from Dr. Morrison such scanty information as is at the disposal of the Chinese Government with regard to the present state of affairs in Mongolia.

This chiefly consists of two reports written by Mr. Larson from Urga at the end of last year, and some notes as to the recent movements of troops in the dependency. Mr. Larson lays stress on the remarkable change which has come over the Mongolian people subsequent to the throwing off the Manchu yoke and the declaration of independence. Lamas who a year ago went about dragging their legs, too lazy even to read their prayers, and showing a scrupulous regard for life which they extended even to the insects on their persons, now step about briskly, rifle in hand, and, what is more, are generally able to hit their mark. Born horsemen, a short training under a Russian officer soon turns these lamas into serviceable irregular mounted troops, well adapted to guerilla warfare. Of the East Mongolian soldiers more than half are lamas, and the taking of human life is now regarded by them as an act of valour. The men from the south-east are especially rough, killing people on the streets of Urga and plundering Chinese merchants with impunity. They say they are only awaiting the warm weather to attack China, and meanwhile are obtaining supplies of arms and ammunition from Russia. The latter country is supposed to help only North Mongolia, but war material finds its way to the south, east, and west. When they are ready the Mongols declare they will fight the Chinese along the whole border line, outside the Great Wall, which they look upon as their legitimate boundary.

Mr. Larson's reports are confirmed by a letter which has been communicated to me confidentially by the British-American Tobacco Company, written in January last by their representative at Urga, and copy of which I have the honour to enclose. This letter also draws attention to the warlike spirit which has come over the formerly peaceful lamas, and the general state of unrest which results therefrom. Russian commercial activities seem to be chiefly directed towards the exploitation of the gold ore which is said to be found in paying quantities in many places.

I have the honour to enclose a memorandum by the military attaché to this legation, showing the present distribution of troops—Chinese and Mongolian—within the disturbed area, and their probable movements in the event of the outbreak of serious fighting. From the military point of view the possibilities of a successful Chinese advance on Urga are very remote, and it is more probable that the Chinese will confine their action to strengthening the frontier garrisons, unless reasons of internal politics compel the Government to assume a stronger line.

There are at present 750 Russian troops at Urga, and 250 men have gone to Uliassutai, but it is uncertain whether these are additional troops or are included in the 750.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Mr. Mamen to British-American Tobacco Company.

Dear Sirs,

Urga, January 9, 1913.

WITH reference to your favour of the 27th November, I beg to give you some information about the conditions existing in Urga. There is not much to be said about this matter as regarding our business especially, but as our business depends for a great part on other circumstances, I shall try to make the whole situation clear to you.

[2849 f-3]

B

The population at Urga has in a few months changed very much. For about a year the Chinese have been returning to China, and as I have had a good chance daily to see long camel caravans with Chinese going south, I have been wondering where all these people came from, and so far as I can see not more than half of them have been from Urga, the other have been from the district round about and from Kiachta. This winter the Chinese kept on going away until the beginning of December, when the cold climate almost stopped them; still a few people are going away nearly every day. Up to date no native shop in Urga has been closed, but Chinese report that in different places around about many Chinese have sold out their cargo and gone away. The Chinese at Urga are to be pitied. Those of the Chinese who could would possibly get away, and I believe they would all go if they could save some of their money. Nearly every day we hear about soldiers who have been to Chinese shops and made all kinds of trouble, and the Chinese have no protection whatever. The Chinese dealers have very little business just now, partly because of the high *li-kin* charges on imported as well as exported goods, while the Russian do not pay any charges, and partly because the Mongols for some reason hate the Chinese and prefer to buy their things from Russian shops.

As lots of Chinese were leaving Urga I could not see who was going to smoke our cigarettes during this winter, as the Urga Mongols are no great smokers, but in October some of the South Mongolian soldiers returned from Kobdo, and in the first days of November all the soldiers, or rather robbers, arrived from East Mongolia. These east Mongols have been our best customers for more than two months, but they are a very rough people, and have made a lot of trouble in the Chinese shops, been fighting and killing each other, shooting at Russian soldiers, and one evening they made a regular attack on the Russian consulate guard. All this frightened the Chinese population very much, and the quick arrival of some 2,000 Cossacks showed that other people also had some doubt about their safety. All the Mongolian soldiers are now preparing to leave Urga, and the east Mongols will be sent south, which means that the road between here and Kalgan will be unsafe. Anybody who knew the Urga Mongols a year ago would find them very different to-day. Before, more than half of these Mongols were lamas, and most of these lamas were driving about from tent to tent having nothing to do. Last summer they started making soldiers out of the lamas, and now they are all soldiers, except those having service at the temples or having any important business. Before, the Urga Mongols were the most peaceful people I ever saw, and to-day they are all rough fighters, going about with modern rifles and pistols and having great fun riding across the Chinese hawkers' tables on the market-place, &c. Many of the lama soldiers who have returned from Kobdo are now very proud of having killed some Chinese or robbed some Chinese shops, and before these people would not kill even a dog. More and more of the Urga Mongols start smoking cigarettes, and I believe it is only a question of time when they all more or less would smoke cigarettes if they would stay at Urga, but as far as I know nearly all the soldiers are leaving Urga very soon.

The Russians are expecting a good business in Urga in the future. A few Russian shops have been started this winter, and the Russians are building several other shops, godowns, and private houses. The Russian gold-mining company, Mongolor, have bought several new mining places, and they are anxious to get a sufficient number of coolies for the mines. Many private Russians are travelling about buying up gold country, and many new mines will be started as soon as the political matter is settled. If the political matter could be settled things would be as they were when we arrived in Urga, and I am quite sure that we would have a good business here in the future, but I have no hope that our business will improve under the Urga Government. I know personally many of the Mongolian princes and most of the Russian subjects in Urga, but I could not tell you who are the rulers of this country. The Mongols have always been very friendly with me, many of the Mongolian officials having called on me and asked how our business was getting on, and not to leave the country, as business will be better later on. Up to date the Mongols have not charged us any *li-kin* for imported goods, and they say themselves that they do not want to charge us anything, but I believe that the day is not far away when the Mongols will have to put *li-kin* charges on our goods.

We never hear anything about how things are going on in the district round about Urga, as very few business people are travelling about; the only thing we hear from time to time is that soldiers have been sent out to catch robbers.

From what I have mentioned above you will understand why the sales have not been better, and under the present conditions I can do nothing to help up our business.

Lately I learned that a lot of the remaining Chinese in Urga will go away soon after Chinese New Year, and I am afraid that our sales will go down instead of up for some time to come.

Our Chinese crew here is very frightened, as well as all other Chinese, and they keep on asking when they can return. They all say that they are willing to follow me anywhere, but they refuse to stay in Urga more than this winter. I have been working all the time with a view to getting a dealer to take over our business at Urga, and just now I have found a Russian dealer, but as yet I have only talked over the matter with him a couple of times. I know this gentleman to be one of the best business men in Urga, having one of the biggest shops over in the Russian city and also a shop here in the Chinese city. As you will note from the gentleman's name, he is a Mahomedan, which is good, as he is a little independent of the many Russian holidays. M. Suleimanof seems to be willing to take over our cigarette business as per the forms you have sent me, which I have carefully translated to him; but he wants everything possible out of the Mustard business—not only candles, but anything Messrs. Mustard and Co. could supply him with, and as regarding this matter I have no information. M. Suleimanof thinks he could go down to Shanghai and settle with you if you could get a Russian interpreter to explain all matters for him. If you leave it to me to settle with M. Suleimanof I would thank you to give me all necessary information. Mr. Rustad has not given me any information in case we turn our business over to a dealer, as he when leaving Urga thought I was only going to stay here cleaning out the stocks, and he knew very well that I could not get any dealer at that time.

If there should be any change in the present conditions I will write you immediately.

Yours respectfully,
O. MAMEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia.

ACCORDING to information received from Mr. Larson, through Dr. Morrison, the only Mongols originally under the influence of the Living Buddha of Urga were the four main tribes of Khalka Mongols, that is to say, those inhabiting Outer Mongolia from Hailar to Uliassutai. These were afterwards followed by the inhabitants of Barga district near Hailar. The movement of the Mongols points to the supposition that the object of the Living Buddha is to obtain the adherence of as many other Mongol tribes as possible, either by persuasion or by force, the tribes inhabiting the districts which lie north of Kalgan being those which he is at the present moment attempting to bring under his control.

Judging from previous events, the two centres where trouble is most likely to ensue between the Chinese and the Mongols in the spring, when military operations will be possible, are the district in Eastern Mongolia between Taonan Fu and Jehol, and that portion of Inner Mongolia lying north of Kalgan.

In the former region there has already been trouble between Mongols and Chinese. The Mongols who rose last August in the Taonan Fu district, a section of one of the Eastern Mongol tribes, appear to have eluded the Chinese forces sent to quell the disturbance, and have moved south-westwards towards Chih-feng in Chih-li province. There have been skirmishes between Chinese and Mongols in this neighbourhood during the past winter, and the rapid movements of the Mongols have given the Chinese troops bordering on this district some anxiety. There is very little information as to the numbers of Mongols engaged in these operations.

In Inner Mongolia lying north of Kalgan there is a little more information available as to the Mongol operations. According to Dr. Morrison the following Mongol troops have occupied the Imperial horse-breeding district of Talikangai, or Dargangai, north-west of Dolonor:—

One thousand Mongols, originally from Eastern Mongolia, south of Hailar, who left Urga for Talikangai towards the end of January.

Six hundred Mongols from the Urga district, who left Urga for Talikangai on the 30th January.

As a support to these troops, 4,000 Mongols who come to Urga from Uliassutai at the beginning of the revolution were on the 15th February under orders to proceed also to Talikangai.

The 1,600 troops mentioned above were well received by the Mongol inhabitants of Talikangai, and Dr. Morrison thinks the adhesion of these latter to the cause of the Living Buddha is of importance, as being likely to lead to the adhesion of other Mongols in Inner Mongolia.

The military measures taken by the Chinese during the winter have been the strengthening of the garrisons along the Mongolian frontier under command of the military governors at Jehol, Kalgan, and Kuei-hua-cheng. The Chinese troops along this frontier from the borders of Manchuria to Kuei-hua-cheng are believed to be between 30,000 and 40,000 in numbers, distributed, as far as can be learnt, approximately as below:—

Under the Military Governor of Jehol:—

About 15,000 to 20,000, distributed in the area stretching north-eastwards from Jehol to the borders of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria.

Under the Military Governor of Kalgan:—

About 10,000 to 12,000, distributed from Dolonor south-westwards to Kalgan and Tatung Fu.

Under the Military Governor of Kuei-hua-cheng:—

About 5,000 to 6,000, mainly within a radius of 50 miles from Kuei-hua-cheng.

These troops are widely scattered throughout a large area in bodies varying in strength from 150 to 2,000, and as the majority of these garrisons are less than 500 in strength, roving bands are able to produce a very disturbing effect. The Chinese troops consist mainly of the old type of soldiers, the provincial troops of Chih-li and Manchuria, though the regular troops are represented by the bulk of the 1st Manchu Division, and by a few small detachments from other divisions. The old-style troops are better suited than regulars for work such as that of suppressing brigandage.

The absence of information makes it extremely difficult to estimate the fighting capacity of the Mongols. They have until recently been generally considered as a peaceable people, and it is doubtful if the revival of the military spirit reported by Mr. Larson is likely to be very lasting. Of the Mongols who have occupied Talikangai, the 1,000 who originally came from Eastern Mongolia are the followers of a well-known robber chief who assisted the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War, and they are possibly little better than brigands. They may probably make good fighters, but they are not necessarily representative of the Mongols as a whole. The extent to which the Mongols are being trained by Russian officers is liable to be exaggerated. Lieutenant Binstead, of the Essex Regiment, who was at Urga a little over a year ago, states that there were then only ten Russians instructing the Mongols, of which one was an officer, two were non-commissioned officers, and the remainder were Buriats. The chief military asset of the Mongols is probably their mobility. Mr. Larson states that with camel transport they are able to move 30 miles a-day, and can obtain horses and supplies everywhere. If this is so, the Chinese troops will have a difficult task in dealing with the Mongols.

There have been at various times reports as to the supply on a large scale of arms and ammunition to the Mongols from Russia, and though there seems little doubt that there has been a considerable amount of traffic in arms and ammunition to Mongolia through Manchuria and elsewhere, this is another matter as to which authentic information is lacking. Lieutenant Binstead, however, states that 5,000 old pattern Russian rifles were ordered in 1911 by the Mongol deputation to St. Petersburg, and that 500 had already arrived in Urga a year ago. Dr. Morrison also states that he has reliable information that the Russian Government have supplied three batteries of quick-firing guns and twenty machine guns to the Mongolian Government.

With regard to future military movements on the part of the Chinese, it is difficult to believe that the Chinese Government will seriously contemplate operations such as an advance to Urga, unless supported by another Power. The purely military difficulties of such an undertaking, if made in sufficient strength to be effective, are so patent that no military officer of any practical experience would advocate it. Lieutenant-Colonel Brissaud-Desmillet, military adviser to the Chinese Government, has already, it is reported, pointed out the impossibility of carrying out such an operation with any hope of success. If sound military considerations are

given heed to, therefore, this operation is not likely to be attempted, but it is impossible to say how far other considerations will force the hands of the authorities. There is danger in the fact that there are certain Chinese officers, especially those with a certain smattering of military knowledge acquired abroad, who are in favour of an expedition to Urga, and the authorities in some of the southern provinces would probably be glad to send to the north contingents of their troops who have not as yet been disbanded, and are therefore a drain on the provincial funds.

On the whole, it is more likely that any further military operations undertaken by the Chinese will be confined to sending more reinforcements to their frontier garrisons, and to the formation of mobile columns to operate against any Mongols causing disturbances in Inner Mongolia. The most likely troops to be used for this purpose are those in Manchuria. The XXth Regular Division at Hsin-min Fu is the nearest regular force to the probable scene of future operations, and the Fengtien provincial troops, under the well-known ex-Hung Hu Tzu chiefs, Chang Tso Lin and Feng Lin Ko, are also likely to be employed. Some of those latter troops now form part of the garrisons on the frontier. They are now in process of reorganisation into regulars, and are now known as the XXVIIth and XXVIIIth Divisions. There is another force in Fengtien, formerly known as the 2nd Manchuria Mixed Brigade, and now reorganised into the XXIXth Division, which is also likely to be employed.

It was reported recently in the press that the troops above mentioned were to be moved into Mongolia, and replaced by troops from Chih-li and Hupei, and in November last it was reported that several mixed brigades were to be prepared by the regular divisions for service in Mongolia. It is therefore quite possible that energetic operations in Inner Mongolia are projected by the military authorities for the spring. Manchuria cannot at present be entirely denuded of its military forces for service in Mongolia, and if the troops most suited for guerilla operations, the Manchurian provincial troops, are sent to Mongolia, it is probable that they will be temporarily replaced by others.

Even if these measures were carried out, however, it does not necessarily imply that more ambitious measures are contemplated than those outlined above, namely, the strengthening of the frontier garrisons, and the formation of mobile columns to prevent, or put down, disturbances in Inner Mongolia.

Register No.

1396

Put away with 1235

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 70

Dated 6/5/1913
Rec. 11/2/1913

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	11 Apr.	ad	<u>Mongolia</u> The recent Russo-Mongolian Treaty: Russian negotiations with China. The question of "sovereignty" or "sovereignty" to be avoided.
Secretary of State.....	11	J. W. H.	
Committee.....	15	—	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

COPY TO INDIA
11/2/1913
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

FOR INFORMATION.

^{definition}
This may perhaps serve as a model
for us in respect of Tibet.

Seen P.O. 100,
28 MAY 1913
W. H. 1727

Previous Papers:— 1235

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10, noon.)


(No. 88.) R.
MONGOLIA.

*Peking, April 9, 1913. 7
(April 9, 10:50 p.m.)*

The Russian Minister informs me that instead of a formal agreement the Russian Government are now willing to settle the Mongolian question by an exchange of notes, by which China recognises the agreement of the 3rd November, 1912, and the protocol. This will obviate the necessity of a submission to Parliament, and may facilitate settlement.

Mongolia will be described as an autonomous State, forming an integral part of China, and the question of suzerainty or sovereignty will be avoided. China is anxious that Russia should undertake to give her good offices to procure cancellation of Mongolian independence, but all Russia will promise is to use her efforts to smooth the future relations between China and Mongolia.

There are still some difficulties connected with commercial concessions in the protocol which are likely to retard the settlement.



Register No.

1235

Secret Department.

Letter from 070. 13846

Dated } 29 March, 1913.
Rec. }

Formally acknowledged _____

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	31 March	J.S.	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....	31	W.H.	Question of attitude to be adopted by H.M.'s Ambassador at St. Petersburg towards Mon- Wlien Mission. F.O. deprecate issue of amended instructions.
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India (of F.O. letter F) 14 April 1913
" (- letter to F.O.)

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Opt. to F.O. accepting their view.

2 April. Letter to F.O.

Secy Pol. Comm-ee,
13 April 1913

Previous Papers:—

MINUTE.

We must presumably defer to the views of the F.O., though the Dept. is still of opinion that it is a pity to miss this opportunity of obtaining an opening in Mongolia.

It may be remarked that the G. of I. have now replied, in a favourable sense, to our telegram of 19 March regarding the proposed Tibet-Chinese conference in India - so that we may ^{now} hope ^{to} make some definite progress towards the settlement of the Tibetan question. The matter is being dealt with separately.

P.1237/13

8ft. 70.

Immediate

Sir,

Book

2 April 1913

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th March 1913, No. 1235, as to the attitude to be adopted by H.M.'s Ambassador at St. Petersburg towards the Mongolian mission at present visiting that city.

In deference to the views of the S. of S. for Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Crewe will not press the suggestion made in my letter of the 25th March last, No. 1099, that amended instructions should be sent to Sir G. Buchanan in regard to the reception of the mission. H. L. is glad to learn, however, that Sir E. Grey fully shares his views as to the desirability of excluding Russian influence from Tibet, & he trusts that this aspect of the question may be borne steadily in mind in any negotiations that may take place with the Russian Govt.

In any further communication
on this subject, please quote

No. 13846/13.

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

14/11/22
1099
17.
FOREIGN OFFICE

March 1, 1913.

1200
11.11
Immediate

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th. instant, recommending that amended instructions should be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg with regard to the reception of the Mongolian Mission.

Sir E. Grey has given his careful attention to the considerations advanced by the Marquess of Crewe, and is fully alive to the desirability of losing no opportunity of obtaining a lever for counteracting the spread of Russian influence into Tibet through Mongolia.

He is not, however, convinced that this end will be best attained by Great Britain acquiring a footing in Mongolia. Though it may be possible for her to establish her right to equal commercial treatment in that country,

yet

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

yet she cannot hope to compete effectively with Russia at Urga or to counteract there any influence which Russia may exert through the Mongolians upon Tibet. Sir E. Grey is, rather, of the opinion that the more effective way of counteracting that influence lies in the exertion of British influence upon Tibet, either directly in the negotiations between the Chinese and Tibetans in India or indirectly through the Nepalese, while at the same time His Majesty's Government, in their discussions with the Russian Government, make use of the action of the latter in Mongolia to justify any British action that it may be desirable to take in Tibet.

Sir E. Grey further thinks that a reversal of the decision that Sir G. Buchanan should decline to receive the Mongolian Mission would merely expose His Majesty's Government to the suspicion of Russia and the hostility of China with very little compensating advantage.

Sir E. Grey trusts that Lord Crewe will appreciate the force of these arguments and agree that it would be
better

(13846/13)

1233

better to let matters remain as they are.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble Servant,

W. Langley

Register No.

Put away with

1235

13

Minute Paper.

1162

Secret Department.

Letter from D.O. 13452

Dated } 27 March, 1913.
Rec. }

Date. Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 28 March J.S.S.

Secretary of State..... 28 J.S.S.

Committee.....

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

MongoliaRussian policy in Mongolia: attitude
of Mongolians, etc.

Copy sent direct to India.

FOR INFORMATION.

This despatch & its enclosure are
of great interest. The following points
may be noticed.

1. Japanese uneasiness at Russian policy.
2. Division among Mongolians as to the policy of the Russian agreement.
3. Mongolian desire to "open their country to the world": see also what is said on p. 8 of the pro-British proclamations of one of the leading Mongolian officials.

This seems to lend force to the arguments used in our letter to F.O. of 25 March (1099) (below) against holding entirely aloof from the Mongolians at the present juncture.

4. Mongolian military ambitions
- 5-10. Character of the Bogdo Lama of Ula (temporal sovereign of Mongolia since

Seen Pol Comtee.
23 APR 1913
(with 1235)

Previous Papers:—

1099 etc

4.

Since Dec. 1911)

11. Gold in Mongolia.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 13452

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*


_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

March 27, 1913.

Reference to previous letter :

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H.M. Minister at Peking No. 108 March 10, 1913.</i>	<i>Mongolia: Russian Activities in</i> 

(Similar letter sent to

)

to India
Tokio.

106.

Peking.

13452 (2)
(MAR 25 1913)

March 10, 1913.

Sir:-

W.A. Rose, C.I.E.,
Late Consul at
Tengyueh.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith notes
of an interesting interview which Mr. Rose of this Legation recently had with Mr. P.A. Larson, a Swedish Missionary attached to the British & Foreign Bible Society who resides in Mongolia and is almost the only member of any nationality other than Russian who has any acquaintance with the recent course of events in that country.

From this account it appears that there are 700 Cossacks at Urga and that some 6,000 Mongols are being trained by Russian officers. This unusual activity amongst a people whose military instincts have been stifled for centuries by the claims of a peace-loving religion has excited considerable interest and even alarm in official circles in Peking where it is now believed that the Mongols, acting under Russian inspiration, are preparing to take the offensive against the Chinese

Right Honourable

forces

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., K.C., M.P.,

&c.,

&c.,

&c.,

forces in ^{Inner} Mongolia.

The Japanese Legation here is closely watching this forward movement on the part of Russia and Mr. Ijuin gives me to understand that it may become necessary to challenge it in case it extends beyond Outer Mongolia. Why Russia, whose vast territory in Siberia still remains undeveloped, should have selected the present moment for adventuring on such a policy arouses the curiosity of most observers here and the only explanation that one can suggest is that, unmindful of the lessons of the past, she is again entering upon a course which must sooner or later bring her into collision with the Power which checked her onward progress in 1904. To us it is important to note that her activities are not wholly confined to Mongolia. Mr. Larson confirms the report which has been current here that consignments of rifles are being sent to Lhasa through Urga by Russian firms; and further interest attaches to the fact that two Gurkhas who were trained at Urga as Russian Consular students have been posted in the laundry at Kumbun which afforded a refuge

refuge to the Dalai Lama on his retreat from Lhasa and
which will now doubtless form a link of connection
between Lhasa and the Russian Agency at Urga.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

(signed) J.N. Jordan.

*P.S. Since writing the above I learn
on good authority that Mr. Larson has
been appointed Adviser to the Bureau
of Tibetan & Mongolian Affairs in
Peking.*

(Sd) J. N. Jordan.

Enclosure in Sir J. Jordan's No. 108 of March 1913 (5)

* Mr. E. C. Wilton, C.M.G., of the
Chinese Consular Service, who ac-
companied Mr. Yung-hsueh to
Shensi in 1904, & afterwards
negotiated (in India) the
Tibet Trade Regulations of 1908.

Mongolian Affairs.

13452

MAR 25 1913

* At a small party yesterday Wilton and I met Mr F. A.

Larson of the British and Foreign Bible Society, who lives
at Kalgan and is an authority on Mongolian affairs. I am
writing a rough account of the conversation as it may be inter-
esting to have a record of events of which we so seldom ob-
tain any news. Larson is an old friend of mine; we travel-
led together ^{in Mongolia} in the winter of 1901, and I realised then, and
in consequence of subsequent events, that he has the confi-
dence and very often the ~~affix~~ affection of the Mongols.
He is a bluff, horse-breeding missionary, thoughtful enough
but easier in his mind when discussing the points of a horse
than questions of high politics. He was disinclined, as it
seemed to me, to talk about Mongolian affairs when first we
met, but Wilton lured him on and roused his interest till he
had told us about most of the points now at issue.

The general impression left upon my mind by the conver-
sation was that the Mongols are divided in their idea of the
Urga Convention; some of the leading lamas and some of the
leading Princes oppose it still; some were forced into sig-
ning, two Princes even being brought from Inner Mongolia un-

der

der arrest for the purpose, whilst the powerful Prince Njas-sakhtu Khan was poisoned by a Lama because he refused to ~~xx~~ agree to the Russian proposals. Larson thinks however that there is no general feeling against the Convention or against Russia, for the Russians are generous and the Mongols desire only to be left alone to tend their flocks and herds. They do not dislike the Chinese, they even look with favour on the Chinese merchants, but they have been alienated from China by the over-bearing manner of the Ambans, who have treated them badly and given all their thought to money-making. The last Amban was attacked by Lamas, as a sign of their dissatisfaction of his settlement of a case, they broke up ~~xx~~ his chair, and he obtained Taels 1000 as damages. They dislike the idea of Chinese colonization and the refusal of the Chinese to open up the country to various enterprises.

I ² thought the most interesting thing Larson said was that he was greeted on his return to Urga last time by the news of the Convention. "It is all arranged," said the Mongols, "we are going to open up the country, to have foreign trade, to open the mines, to develop the country; it is splendid." It seems to show that the Mongols are generally ^a pleased at the idea of opening up the country.

"But," said Larson, "you have not opened the country to all the world - only to Russia; you have given to Russia alone the right to buy and sell, to open mines, to exercise a practical monopoly." This was stoutly denied by the highly-placed Mongolians. They assured him that for fourteen days and nights they had argued this point with A. Korostovetz. He had pointed out the advantage of ~~xxxx~~ dealing with Russia alone, but they would have none of it; they knew that it was better to have 3 people wanting to buy their wool, and three people from whom they could buy their flour rather than one, and so they resisted the exclusive claims of Russia; "And we got our own way about that", they said.

It seems not impossible that the Russian and Mongol text of the Convention may be different, and Larson says the ^{gols} ~~mongols~~ are confident that they have opened the country to all the world. They were/persistent in their desire that the Consuls and merchants and miners of all countries should come to them, and that they should take their place in the world. Larson has always seemed to me a sane actual sort of fellow, and I do not think he would gather a wrong impression in a matter of ~~of~~ this sort.

Kalgan; Larson thinks that in reality there are 10,000 to 15,000 at Kalgan and beyond.

Consignments of rifles, most of them Winchester, are being sent to Lhasa through Urga by Russian firms.

There are 700 Cossacks at Urga.

The Commander in Chief of the Mongol army is a robber chief who became famous during the Russo-Japanese war in consequence of his raids. After the war was over he returned to Mongolia, where he harried the Chinese and sometimes the Russians. He was sent into Russian territory and was given a piece of land. Now he is respectably established in the army; he is old and opium-sodden, but has young and promising relations who are coming on.

Chinese colonisation appears to have gone on apace during the last ten years, both in the Tao-nan fu district and also North of Kalgan; they manage to grow oats and wheat, and the farmers are prospering. Larson's horse ranch is, as far as I remember, about 100 miles North of Kalgan; he is beyond the zone of Chinese colonisation; he spends the winter in Kalgan, and goes to Urga once a year.

The Bogdo Hutukhtu of Urga, the supreme pontiff ~~and~~ and

present

present Emperor of Mongolia, is described~~xxx~~ as a weak man, almost always intoxicated with the champagne which he obtains from France, owning a modern-furnished and luxurious palace, but preferring to sit on the carpets of his tent. He is Tibetan by birth, son of the Dalai Lama's steward, and the 8th Tibetan reincarnation who has been supreme in Urga. The Chinese have always kept a hold over the Mongols through the Dalai Lama and the Lama Church, and for this reason ^{and} Mongolia and Tibet are closely linked in the policies of China. There was a strong feeling of reverence for the person of the Emperor in Mongolia, both among Lamas and people, but they are out of sympathy with a republican China.

The Bogdo, contrary to all rules of the Lama Church^r, is married to a young Mongolian girl, who is obviously a character to be reckoned with. Larson describes her as a vigorous ~~woman~~ woman, with strong business instincts, and two shops of her own in Urga. She has not only induced the Lama ~~Church~~ Church to recognize her, but she has been granted the rank of a Reincarnation, little if any lower than that of the Bogdo himself. Larson considers her a decided factor in the situation. It is interesting to know that she is the advocate of the Chinese

cause

cause at Urga.

It is commonly known that the Russians have little use for the Bogdo, and that they have determined to ~~will~~ divide the spiritual and temporal power; they will probably choose a "Black Man" or lay Mongol as the next ~~emperor~~ emperor, leaving the Bogdo to conduct the spiritual affairs of the Church. It will be interesting to see if a Tibetan reincarnation will again be chosen.

Two Buriats, who were trained at Urga as Russian Consular Students, have now retired into the great Lamasery at Kumbun (near Kokonor), where they are enrolled as monks. Five years ago the ~~Russians~~ Russians declared that the Bogdo should soon be Emperor of China.

As to mining affairs, the country appears to be rich in gold. Von Grotz opened a mine North of Urga, but was recalled by his Company as he fell foul of the Mongols having promised to pay royalties of 18 % to the Chinese Government; his successor now pays 20 % to the Mongol Government; the mine produced £500,000 worth of gold last year, and could have done much better but for the difficulty of obtaining labour. One of the most powerful lamas has invited Larson to open a mine

jointly

jointly with him. Larson is scarcely likely to be tempted, but he thinks the Mongols are quite sincere in their desire to allow foreigners to develop the country, and that they are only too anxious to invite them in. This may account for the terms of the Urga Convention, which appears so strangely generous.

When we said Good-bye I asked Larson why he had not been to see me, or let me know he was here. He said that he had not felt able to see Sir John, as he did not wish to talk about recent events in Mongolia, and that it had seemed better therefore to avoid the Legation. I think that pressure must have been ^{br} brought to bear on him, as he is generally very frank, and he knows that the Mongols like us. He was at ^{at-} least quite generous with his information, and perhaps we may hope for a copy of the Mongol text of the Urga Convention. Wilton certainly did his best to secure the promise of it, and Larson regarded him with a sad smile as he confided to me his ~~intention~~ intention not to gossip.

I do not think Larson mentioned the date of his last visit to Urga, but it was evidently quite recent, as the Convention had already been signed.

March 4, 1913.

(S) A. R.

Register No.

1099

Put away with 1235

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O.

Dated 20 } march 1913.
Rec. 22 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	22 March	AB	<u>Mongolia</u> The Mongolian mission to St. Petersburg. Reported orders for war matériel, &c.
+ Secretary of State.....	22	St	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Sign
C 23 III 13

Copy to India.

CONFIDENTIAL
28 MAR 1913
SECRETARY'S N2 13

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

8th to F.O. raising question of modifying our attitude towards the mission, in view of probable effects in Tibet of allowing Mongolia to pass under exclusive influence of Russia.

25 March. Letter to F.O.

SEEN FOR [unclear]

103 APR 1913

(103/12 1235)

Previous Papers:—

1075 vc

India Office,

Whitehall. S.W.

The substitution can be made

Lord Curzon

C 23. III. 13

The phrase "Russian preserve" is
brief - and, so far, good: but it
conflicts with the fable
convenue. In: substitute

the more roundabout but, I
think, correct phrase that I have
pencilled in the margin? The
point is not very important.

L. H.

22-3-13

12th March
Immediate

8/11/70.

Sir,

25 March/13

I am directed by the S. of S. for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th March 1913, No. 12285, enclosing copy of a despatch from Sir George Buchanan regarding the proceedings of the Mongolian Mission at St. Petersburg.

(98/12)
The Marquess of Crewe fully appreciates the general grounds of policy on which H. M.'s Ambassador was instructed in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 96 of the 4th Feb last not to receive the mission. But he will submit for the consideration of the S. of S. for Foreign Affairs that, by holding entirely aloof at the present juncture, H. M.'s Govt may lose an opportunity, which is probably unlikely to recur, of obtaining a footing in Mongolia which might prove of great value in future.

^{future}
dealings with the Russian Govt.

Shen was laid by Sir J. Jordan,
in his telegram No. 64 of the 6th
March 1913, on the close connection
of Mongolia with Tibet; and Lord
Crewe cannot but fear that, if
~~the former country is allowed to~~
~~become an exclusively Russian pro-~~
~~vince,~~ a revival of Russian
influence in Tibet, which it has
been the policy of H.M.'s Govt. for the
last 10 years to counteract, must
inevitably follow.

Should Sir E. Grey concur in
this view, the question of sending
amended instructions to Sir G.
Buchanan might well perhaps
be considered.

(sd) T. W. Holderness.

(with subjects)
Russia ^{come} to enjoy by treaty
or practice a predominating
influence ^{in Mongolia} as compared with
other foreign States & their
subjects.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 12285

and address —

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

111075

1000

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*


Foreign Office,

March 20 , 1913.

Reference to previous letter :

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H. M. Ambassador at St. Petersburg No. 84 March 13, 1913.</i>	<i>Mongolian Mission at St. Petersburg.</i>



(Similar letter sent to

)

No. 84

1000

St. Petersburg

12285

March. 13, 1913

MAR 17 1913

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that it is reported in the Russian Press that the Mongolian Mission is shortly leaving St. Petersburg for Urga via Moscow.

The " Novoe Vremya " states that the Mission has entered into an agreement with Mr. F.K. Shiffler representing the Russian and Foreign Ammunition Works for an order of ammunition for the Mongolian Army and has granted him permission to open a store for ammunition, tents, and war material at Urga. The " Novoe Vremya " adds that the Head of the Mission recently visited the Lianosoff Oil Co. and encouraged them to start business in Mongolia.

The Members of the Mission last week again requested me to receive them but in accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 96 of the 4th. ultimo I declined to do so.

I have the honour to be
with the highest respect
Sir,
your most obedient
humble servant.

(Sgd) George W. Buchanan.

Right Honble.

Sir E. Grey, Bart., K.G., P.C.,
etc., etc., etc.

CONFIDENTIAL.

916/13

(21)

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7, 11 A.M.)

Peking, March 6, 1913.

(March 6, 11:50 P.M.)

(No. 64.)

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 3rd March.

If terms of peace are to be discussed between General Chung and a Thibetan delegate it seems essential that we should take direct part in the negotiations. Without such participation it would, in my opinion, be impossible to control their course.

As to the effect of the recent developments—

1. China has entirely lost her position in Thibet and can only regain it by conquest or negotiation. Major Pereira, who has seen troops of Szechuan expedition, considers prospect of reconquest very remote, and Liend, the late amban, told me yesterday that, in his opinion, Thibetan Government would never again agree to presence of Chinese troops in Lhasa. The recent excesses had, he said, exasperated the whole population.

2. There can be no doubt that Russian action in Mongolia must react seriously upon the situation in Thibet. Conclusion of the treaty with Mongolia, which is virtually under Russian protection, gives Russia new and indirect interest in Thibet which the close spiritual bond between Thibet and Mongolia and the Thibetan origin and associations of the Hutukhtu at Urga afford ample opportunities of developing and strengthening in the future. Consignments of rifles are being sent to Lhasa through Urga by Russian firms, and unusual military activity which the Mongols are developing under Russian guidance can hardly fail to have its effect on their coreligionists in Thibet.

These new facts—the elimination of Chinese influence and the connection which Russia has established through Mongolia—seem to me to demand revision of our Thibetan policy and an abandonment of our disinterested attitude unless we are prepared to see Thibet, which cannot, I conceive, long stand alone, gravitate towards Russia. The first essential of such a change would be the establishment of closer relations with the Dalai Lama and a fuller knowledge of what arrangements Thibetan Government are prepared to make. In return for guarantee against Chinese encroachment on her eastern border, Thibet might be induced to authorise the reinstatement at Lhasa of a Chinese amban with suitable escort. A tripartite agreement between Great Britain, China, and Thibet would probably be the best solution, and negotiations in India between all three parties might serve as a useful preliminary to such an agreement; even their failure would leave us in better position to negotiate with Thibet [?] independently of China.

(Sent to India.)

Register No.

Put away with *1235**13*

Minute Paper.

1075

Secret Department.

Letter from *26* *10402*Dated *17* } *March* 1913.
Rec. *18*

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>20 March</i>	<i>At</i>	<i>Mongolia</i> <i>Russo-Mongolian Agreement. Views of Board of Trade as to its effects on British Commerce.</i>
Secretary of State.....	<i>20</i>	<i>P. W.</i>	
Committee.....	<i>23</i>	<i>E.</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to *India*COPY
11 APR 1913
SECRETARY'S N2 15*(Label from nch 5 sec 1)*

FOR INFORMATION.

[The latest news of the situation in Mongolia - see attached press cuttings - we seem to show that the Chinese still contemplate military action against the Mongolians.]

Seen Pol Comm.,

13 APR 1913

(Vol. 1235)

Previous Papers:—

937
etc.

CHINA AND MONGOLIA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, MARCH 14.

According to a Kharbin message conferences are being held at Changchun between the Manchurian civil and military authorities with reference to the projected Chinese expedition to Mongolia. In consequence of a lack of ready money the State banks in the provinces have authorized the issue of so-called military notes to the amount of two million dollars. According to Japanese information the export of corn from Kirin has been prohibited in order to secure supplies for the Mongolian expeditionary corps.

The Russian Government, while still unwilling to credit China with any foolhardy designs, will be compelled to take counter measures if the concentration of Chinese troops in Manchuria continues.

"Times", 15 March 1913

CHINA AND MONGOLIA.

STRAINED RELATIONS.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, MARCH 18.

Yuan Shih-kai has intimated to the Khutukhta through the Secretary to the Presidency that, in view of the consistent misconstruction of Chinese intentions, the Republic has decided to break off correspondence with the Mongolian Government. The intimation may mean little or much, according to events.

A message from Kwangtchengsze states that Chinese troops are being moved from Liaoyuanchu, Fakumen, and Kaitun to Tsitsihar. The troops include 3,500 men of the 20th Division and are locally believed to be destined to form part of an expeditionary corps for Mongolia. It is assumed here that China is aware of the circumstances in which the Russo-Mongolian Treaty becomes operative.

"Times",

19 March 1913

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 10402

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

1075

H/937
H/812

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*

*_____ and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,

March 17, 1913.

Reference to previous letter:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Board of Trade March 4, 1913	Russo-Mongolian Agreement

(Similar letter sent to

)

copy.

BOARD OF TRADE,
(Commercial Department),
GWYDYR HOUSE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S. W.
4th March, 1913.

1140.
10402)

Sir:-

I am directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 5th, (No.3825), with its enclosures, relative to the recent Russo-Mongolian Agreement, and in reply I am to state that there does not appear to be any occasion to call for a further report on the subject in view of the detailed information now furnished.

Mr. Lyons's Memorandum, which formed one of the enclosures in question, mentions many points in which Russia secures new and valuable concessions in Mongolia, as compared with her rights in the past, and although - as observed in the Board's letter of January 22nd - these do not appear to be conferred on her by the express terms of the Protocol as exclusive or preferential privileges, the Board think that there is little doubt

that

Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

that in practice they will prove to be of that character, and are intended as such.

It is hardly likely, however, that British commercial interests will be seriously affected by the Agreement, since whatever trade in British goods may be done in Western and Outer Mongolia, probably is, and is likely to continue, for the most part, in the hands of Russians and Chinese.

In the absence of evidence that British commercial interests will be prejudiced, the Board are not of opinion that there is adequate reason, from a purely commercial point of view, for any protest being made by His Majesty's Government, on the ground of infringement of most-favoured-nation rights or of the principle of the "open-door"; whilst even though this country may be entitled by Treaty with China to share in the privileges which have been obtained by Russia, they find it difficult, as stated in their previous letter, to see how any such claim could be enforced.

The

The question whether it would be desirable on political grounds, to make such a protest, or to seek compensation elsewhere, is one for the consideration of Sir E. Grey.

The Board presume that Sir J. Jordan and Sir G. Buchanan will receive instructions to report at once any development of Russian influence in Mongolia that may come to their notice.

I have &c.,

(Signed) H. Llewellyn Smith.

Register No.

Put away with 1235

Minute Paper.

937

Secret Department.

2 Letters from - 30.

Dated 7/6 March 1913.

Rec. - 29 May.

Date. Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 12 March A.H.

Secretary of State..... 13 P.W. H

Committee..... 15 C.

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia

The Mongolian deputation to St. Petersburg.
H.M.'s Ambassador instructed to decline
to receive them on the ground that "Mongolia
is an integral part of China."

Copy to India P. B. & S. No.
(See within)

FOR INFORMATION.

29 May - Tel. to Peking, No. 33, Feb. 6.
added

DECL. NOT CORRECT.
APR 18 1913

Previous Papers:—

657

937

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[February 10.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 4.

[6222]

No. 1.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 40.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, February 5, 1913.

IN the course of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 3rd instant, I told his Excellency that the Mongolian deputation had sent to the embassy to ask me to receive them, but that I had excused myself from doing so.

M. Sazonof said that when they came to see him last week they had informed him that they proposed calling at the French and British Embassies, but not at either the Austrian or German Embassy, and that he had tried to dissuade them from carrying out this intention. It was curious, his Excellency added, that the Mongols should be so quick to draw a distinction between the Powers of the Triple *Entente* and of the Triple Alliance.

I called his Excellency's attention to the fact that, whereas he had always spoken to me of Mongolian autonomy, the Mongols themselves never used that term, but spoke instead of their independence. M. Sazonof replied that this was owing to the fact that the Mongolian language only had one and the same word to convey both these meanings. He had, however, always made it clear that Russia recognised China's suzerainty over Mongolia.

On my remarking that, after the engagements which she had taken, Russia might find herself in an awkward situation were the Chinese to send a large military expedition against the Mongols, his Excellency said that it might be necessary to dispatch a few sotnias of Cossacks to certain points, but that he thought that a word of warning spoken at Peking would suffice to make the Chinese Government desist from any military operations.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

P.S.—I should perhaps mention that the French Ambassador told me last night that he had, after all, declined to receive the Mongolian delegates when they called at the embassy.

G. W. B.

[2807 k-4]

*Circulate with
28 Feb 1913*

28 Feb

*Copied to India,
28 Feb 1913,
Lg. 7.*

937.

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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[February 6.]

(rec'd. Jan 70.
30 May)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 2.

[5248]

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 33.)


(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 6, 1913.

MONGOLIAN deputation at St. Petersburg having asked His Majesty's Ambassador to receive them, his Excellency has been instructed to decline to do so.

[2807 f—2]

Put with file
J.E.J.
- 30/5/13




Mr 65742 ✓
Dy 5/3

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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[February 4.]

SECTION 5.

[5248]

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 96.)


(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 35 of 3rd February: Mongolian deputation.

You should decline to receive deputation. It would give unnecessary offence to China, but if you consider it necessary, you can quote reason you gave to French Ambassador.

[2807 d-5]



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[February 3.]

SECTION 5.

[5248]

No. 1.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.)


St. Petersburg, February 3, 1913.

MONGOLIAN deputation sent to embassy this morning to ask me to receive them. I excused myself on the ground of ill-health.

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told the French Ambassador the other day that, contrary to the advice which he had given them, they contemplated calling at the French and British Embassies in the hope of inducing France and Great Britain to recognise their independence. On the Ambassador asking me what I should do, I replied that, as Mongolia was an integral part of China, I did not see how we could receive them. His Excellency said that, as he had not my excuse, he would tell them that he could not receive them officially, but only in their private capacity.

What would you wish me to do should they repeat their request?

[2807 c—5]



Source Citation

Part 1 The Situation in Mongolia (1913). 1913. MS Political and Secret Department Records: Series 10: Departmental Papers: Political and Secret Separate (or Subject) Files (1902-1931) IOR/L/PS/10/364/1. British Library.